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Audit summary 
Investing in and delivering infrastructure is a core function of government. Investments 
are made to achieve economic, social and environmental outcomes, including 
increased productivity, access to services and improved service delivery, and 
improvements to the natural environment. 
Victoria’s level of infrastructure investment is significant. The Victorian Government 
estimates the total value of current projects at around $35.6 billion, with projected 
expenditure of around $7.6 billion in 2013–14 alone. 
Major Projects Victoria’s (MPV) role is to provide ‘expert project delivery services to 
Victorian Government departments and other agencies engaged in the delivery of 
complex, technically challenging and unique projects of state significance’. Typically, it 
delivers projects on behalf of public sector entities that do not have the required 
in-house project management capability or expertise. MPV is a business unit within the 
Department of Business and Innovation (DBI). 
Conclusions 
MPV is not able to demonstrate that it operates, and manages infrastructure projects 
effectively, efficiently or economically.  
MPV operates under the Project Development and Construction Management Act 
1994, which provides it with considerable scope to perform its functions. The powers 
that the legislation provides MPV require an effective system of checks and balances 
to make it accountable to the government, Parliament and the community. Adequate 
checks and balances do not exist, particularly in the way that MPV manages its 
internal contracts.  
Poor oversight by DBI and the lack of effective internal controls have contributed to 
poor governance standards and a lack of organisational integrity and accountability—
contrary to the behaviours expected in the Public Administration Act 2004. DBI 
responses to Parliamentary committees have provided impressions of MPV’s 
performance that cast doubt on the veracity of information it has provided. There are 
continuing weaknesses in managing probity, and it is likely that MPV is not achieving 
the best use of public resources. By not collecting and reporting reliable data related to 
its performance, MPV has also failed to meet public sector accountability standards. 
MPV’s governance and operational shortcomings are pervasive and should be 
addressed as a priority. 
MPV has reported to Parliament that it has achieved 100 per cent performance over a 
14-year period. This raises questions about whether Parliament and the community 
have been reliably informed, and highlights fundamental shortcomings of MPV’s and 
DBI’s governance. 
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MPV is not complying with relevant legislation. In addition to shortcomings in the way 
that DBI administers elements of the Public Administration Act 2004, its record 
management practices do not meet with the requirements of the Public Records Act 
1973. Delegations DBI has made under the Project Development and Construction 
Management Act 1994 have elements that may conflict with the Standing Directions 
made under the Financial Management Act 1994.  
There are also major deficiencies with the way MPV manages internal contracts, with 
missing contracts, and variations without adequate reason or assessment of 
performance. This maladministration around contracts not only diminishes 
transparency and accountability, but increases the risk of error and fraud.  
MPV adopts employment practices that do not represent value-for-money and lack 
transparency and integrity. These practices have included employees resigning and 
being re-engaged soon after to perform the same work at a much higher cost to the 
public.  
While MPV has established a generally sound project management framework, there 
remain gaps that have not been addressed for four years. Ineffective oversight and 
quality assurance processes mean that the framework and better practice are not 
routinely applied, resulting in poor project planning that could ultimately lead to poor 
project outcomes and increased costs.  
MPV sees itself as a leader in project management across the Victorian public sector. 
However, it does not have any process to systematically and routinely learn from 
projects and, therefore, continually improve. Its inability to routinely learn from the 
projects it undertakes and change practices consequently limits its ability to lead other 
public sector infrastructure deliverers and set standards for project delivery and 
management. 
Its poor oversight mechanisms mean that it cannot demonstrate a sound 
understanding of how it is performing across all of its projects. While MPV has 
performance indicators in place, it does not use them, and it does not have sufficient 
information to determine how well it is performing.  
Findings 
Role and governance 
Role and function 
MPV is generally undertaking its legislated functions, which include facilitating and 
managing public construction for departments and public bodies, providing 
consultancies, information and advice to departments and public bodies, and providing 
advice and information to the Minister for Major Projects. However, it is not performing 
its roles in the manner the government intended. Rather than routinely delivering 
‘major projects’, MPV manages the delivery of a relatively small number of high-value 
capital projects and a larger number of smaller planning-related projects.  
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While MPV sees itself as a leader in project management and delivery, it is not 
performing a leadership role, nor is it performing a research role. MPV’s role extends 
to other areas that have little apparent ongoing connection to its core role or functions, 
such as owning and maintaining physical assets, managing leases for three 
restaurants and sitting as a board member for the company managing the Regent 
Theatre lease. 
Reviews of MPV’s role and functions, such as the October 2007 Cabinet review of 
major projects in Victoria have resulted in no change, and the issues identified then 
remain unresolved. 
Project human resources 
Since its establishment in 1987, MPV has relied on a mix of employees and 
contractors to perform its functions. However, there are fundamental weaknesses with 
its contract management, and it is uncertain whether MPV’s staff are, in fact, 
contractors or employees in both the legal and practical sense. The status of MPV’s 
staff has significant financial and legal implications for DBI. 
There is no documentation within MPV that demonstrates an assessment of the need 
for any of its contractors, or the existing capability and capacity within the public sector. 
MPV was able to provide only limited information around its recruitment of contractors. 
However, in most situations it is evident that MPV considered only the use of 
contractors. There is strong evidence to contradict DBI’s statements to Parliament 
about the availability of public sector employees, which implied that it had assessed 
there were none available. This raises broader questions about the veracity of the 
information provided by DBI to Parliament.  
Of the current staff that MPV considers to be independent contractors, this audit 
identified four who were working for MPV as public sector employees before they were 
appointed as contractors. This process of resigning from MPV and being re-engaged 
within a very short period to perform the same work at a much higher pay rate lacks 
integrity and transparency, and does not demonstrate value-for-money. Depending on 
the information the employees had, this process may have provided them with an 
unfair advantage during tender processes, and at a minimum is a declarable potential 
or perceived conflict of interest. None of the four contractors or selection panels 
declared a conflict of interest. 
The way that MPV manages its staff raises significant uncertainty about their 
employment status. While determining the employment status of a contractor requires 
a case-by-case assessment, based on the evidence of this audit, MPV’s contractors 
satisfy a number of the criteria that would suggest they are in fact employees at law.  
If this is correct, then DBI may be financially liable to past and present contractors for 
unpaid leave entitlements and for other costs associated with hiring an employee, such 
as fringe benefits tax, Workcover, training and pay-roll tax. Given the value and length 
of some contracts, this liability could be significant. 
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Contract management 
Effectively managing contracts is a fundamental good governance issue. It provides 
appropriate checks and balances so there is assurance that the contractor is providing 
the required services at the required standard, and that there is efficient and 
economical use of public funds. 
MPV’s management of its internal contracts is significantly deficient. There are multiple 
weaknesses with most contracts that have occurred through MPV’s maladministration, 
which as a consequence is likely to have increased the risk of error and fraud. 
Complying with legislation 
While MPV does not have its own legislation, in performing its functions it is required to 
adhere to a range of other legislation. These include the Project Development and 
Construction Management Act 1994, the Financial Management Act 1994 and the 
Public Records Act 1973. 
MPV is complying with the key provisions of the Project Development and Construction 
Management Act 1994, particularly in terms of nominating projects and establishing 
delegations in a manner consistent with the legislation. However, it is uncertain 
whether MPV is complying with the Standing Directions relating to authorisation of 
payments made under the Financial Management Act 1994. Within MPV, all the 
director positions are held by contractors and four of MPV’s seven project director 
roles are held by contractors. They have all been delegated the power to authorise 
payments. This conflicts with the Standing Directions, which prohibit contractors from 
authorising payments. DBI has not sought specific advice to be certain of its position.  
MPV also may not be complying with the Public Records Act 1973, given the 
deficiencies identified with the way it manages public records. 
Project management and performance 
Project management 
Effective project management requires appropriate knowledge, skills, tools and 
techniques to successfully deliver a project. To enable consistency across projects—a 
goal of MPV—at a minimum the tools and techniques should be documented, and 
used in accordance with established processes.  
MPV has a generally sound project management framework in place, which adopts 
most of the principles of better practice project management. However, MPV is not 
consistently applying the framework, or better practice principles, across its projects.  
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Project oversight 
MPV does not have effective project oversight mechanisms in place that enable it to 
quality assure project management practices and learn from projects, and it does not 
have a sound understanding of the status of its projects at an organisational level. 
Despite the project management framework being in place for four years, there is no 
system or process to update it. MPV does not have systems and processes to 
routinely capture and assess information from industry and compare it against the 
project management framework, or assess the currency of the information in it. MPV 
has not updated the project management framework more generally and it still 
contains incomplete information, including elements of three sections and four 
appendices that have not been started. 
MPV recognises the importance of continuous improvement in its annual business 
plans, identifying ‘capturing the learnings from successes and failures’ as one of its key 
leadership behaviours. Despite this, it does not have adequate systems or processes 
in place to routinely learn from all projects and continuously improve.  
MPV has a range of reporting mechanisms in place to provide DBI’s and its own 
management with information about the status of its projects. These mechanisms 
focus primarily on individual projects or broader organisational issues. There is no 
management information that collates information on all projects and other MPV 
activities to give management a sense of MPV’s overall performance. Information 
obtained through meetings about overall project performance is not documented and 
resides with individuals. This is a gap in MPV’s and DBI’s governance.  
Project performance 
MPV publicly reports that in delivering projects, it achieves 100 per cent performance. 
However, it is not clear what elements of projects MPV assesses to determine this 
level of performance. Given the gaps in its management information, we obtained data 
from MPV to enable us to assess the actual performance of its projects. 
It is recognised that MPV is not responsible for all changes to a project that may 
impact on costs and time. Factors outside of MPV’s control, such as client entities 
changing the project’s scope, latent conditions and weather can affect project cost and 
timeliness. However, this should not prevent MPV from maintaining management 
information on the actual performance of projects and accounting for these factors in 
any reporting. 
The data that MPV relies on to underpin its monitoring and reporting is unreliable, 
highlighting major deficiencies in its data management, record keeping and 
governance. 
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MPV’s data shows that for the main construction contracts—typically the largest part of 
a capital infrastructure project—most underperform against time and cost measures. 
The data shows that, on average, contracts exceed the expected cost by around 
18 per cent and exceed the planned end date by around 37 per cent. This situation is 
not reflected in MPV’s reporting on its performance in Budget Paper 3 where it reports 
performance of 100 per cent against targets for its projects.  
Reporting performance 
Monitoring and reporting performance 
MPV has developed performance indicators as part of its external and internal 
accountability requirements. Both seek to assess performance against departmental 
objectives, however, there are significant inadequacies. Both indicators differ and 
neither is related to MPV’s objectives. They are neither relevant nor appropriate, and 
are therefore incapable of fairly representing actual performance. Regardless, MPV 
does not properly assess its performance against its indicators. 
MPV cannot reasonably explain the key elements of its reported quality indicator and 
what it is intending to measure. Significantly, MPV’s ‘process’ to collate and analyse 
performance data to inform Budget Paper 3 is deficient and unauditable.  
While MPV has reported to Parliament each year that it achieves 100 per cent 
performance in the delivery of its projects, it could not adequately demonstrate that it 
actually collects and collates data, and nor could we identify sufficient and appropriate 
evidence that this occurs.  
This raises serious doubts about the veracity of the data reported in Budget Paper 3. 
It also raises doubts about the veracity of information that DBI has provided to 
Parliament, particularly through the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee’s 
outcomes and estimates inquiries. 
Departmental heads are responsible for the general conduct, and the effective, efficient 
and economical management of their department. Understanding whether the 
department or its business units are operating to these standards requires a sound 
performance monitoring framework. 
MPV and DBI have an internal quality measure to assess MPV’s performance, 
included in business and corporate plans: ‘achieve delivery of 80 per cent of 
infrastructure projects within +/– 10 per cent of agreed time, cost and scope’. Despite 
this indicator having been in place for nearly 10 years, MPV does not monitor its 
performance against it, and therefore does not know how it is performing at an 
organisational level. Neither MPV nor DBI collate, analyse or report data for its internal 
indicators at the business unit or corporate level. 
Like its external measures, MPV has no processes in place to assess its performance. 
This is a further fundamental failing of MPV’s and DBI’s governance. 
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There are a range of deficiencies with the MPV and DBI internal quality indicator that 
make it inappropriate to assess MPV’s performance. MPV could not explain the 
indicator’s key elements and what it was intending to measure. This means that MPV 
cannot track the indicator over time—a key element of an appropriate indicator. It is 
similarly unclear what ‘time’, ‘cost’, and ‘agreed’ mean, and why these particular 
performance standards were selected. 
A further issue with the indicator is that it has a performance standard of 80 per cent 
and, of that 80 per cent, within +/– 10 per cent. This indicator is very similar to the 
quality indicator in Budget Paper 3, which has a performance standard of 100 per cent. 
MPV’s internal indicator appears to accept a lower level of performance compared with 
the external measure. MPV was unable to explain the reasons for this. 
Reviewing Major Projects Victoria’s performance indicators 
MPV has been aware of weaknesses with its performance monitoring framework since 
2009, yet little has occurred to address these weaknesses. In its 2009–10 business 
plan, MPV developed a business improvement project aimed at improving the 
consistency and delivery of MPV’s services. Specifically, the project intended to: 
• develop processes and methods to review all current MPV projects—
by December 2009 
• determine key performance indicators for MPV projects—by February 2010 
• review functionality of processes, methods and key performance indicators—
by April 2010. 
This project was not progressed and MPV has taken no action to review its 
performance indicators. Given the weaknesses identified, not just with MPV’s 
indicators but also the absence of processes to assess its performance, this is a 
significant failing. 
In March 2011, DBI reviewed its performance indicators. The context for the review 
was the planned introduction of the Public Finance and Accountability Bill in 2010. The 
review focused on DBI as a whole, although it addressed to a limited extent MPV’s 
performance indicators. 
The review considered that the only indicator MPV could be held accountable for was 
time and cost. It suggested the indicator ‘MPV projects delivered within (%) of agreed 
time, cost and scope’, on the basis that it was attributable and specific; accountable 
and meaningful; measurable and robust; and available and manageable. This is the 
same as the existing indicator. 
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However, the review’s assessment of MPV’s performance indicators is deficient 
because it recommends maintaining the current indicator without understanding how or 
if MPV and DBI use it, among other weaknesses. It is unclear what action MPV has 
taken in response to the review’s findings related to MPV. Despite regarding itself as a 
leader in major projects across Victoria, MPV has limited knowledge of how other 
entities assess their performance. MPV recently reviewed the Victorian Budget Papers 
to determine how other departments report on their capital projects. This was 
undertaken in response to this audit. MPV has no knowledge of how other similar 
Australian or international entities assess their performance. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
 Major Projects Victoria should:  
1. obtain legal advice as to the employment status of its 
contractors and the provision of financial authorisations to 
them 
23 
2. review the skills and capabilities required to carry out its 
functions and, if necessary, obtain advice from the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet about the ability for it 
to create additional public sector executive officer positions 
within Major Projects Victoria 
23 
3. review its contract management practices and implement 
practices that are consistent, at a minimum, with the 
processes and policies that the Victorian Government 
Purchasing Board has established 
23 
4. establish and implement a performance management 
framework for internal contractors so that payments and 
variations are linked to acceptable performance 
23 
5. undertake an independent fraud risk assessment, 
particularly around contract management and payment 
systems, given the weaknesses in controls 
23 
6. review its recruitment practices involving ex-employees so 
that, as a minimum, perceived and potential conflicts of 
interest are managed, and value-for-money obtained 
23 
7. establish a conflict of interest register and processes, in 
line with the Department of Business and Innovation’s 
conflict of interest policy, to enable it to identify and 
manage perceived, potential and actual conflicts of interest 
24 
8. review its records management processes and practices 
against the requirements of the Public Records Act 1973 
and associated standards and policies, and implement 
changes as appropriate  
24 
9. review the completeness of its key records, including 
contracts and project documentation 
24 
10. review its business planning to provide better clarity 
around its role, the actions it will implement to fulfil its role 
and the processes it will use to assess achievement of its 
role 
24 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
11. The Department of Treasury and Finance should clarify the 
purpose of Standing Direction 2.4(i) and whether it applies 
in all situations, and take appropriate action to give the 
requirement the necessary legislative force 
24 
 Major Projects should:  
12. develop a process to routinely capture and assess industry 
and other information, and update its Project Management 
Framework as appropriate 
42 
13. develop robust oversight processes so that the Project 
Management Framework is appropriately applied and key 
stages approved and reviewed, and there is compliance 
with required project standards, policies and procedures 
42 
14 establish a project review mechanism so that lessons from 
each project are identified, assessed, incorporated into 
practices as appropriate, and communicated 
42 
15. define and document governance arrangements for 
projects without external clients or end users so that there 
is an appropriate level of accountability, direction and 
oversight of project implementation 
42 
16. develop management information that provides a reliable, 
documented overview of project performance across all 
projects 
42 
17. define what an original approved budget is and 
consistently apply it to all projects 
42 
18. strengthen financial management system controls so that 
original budgets cannot be altered, and so there is a clear 
audit trail of changes 
42 
19. review and address data quality and reliability issues, 
including assessing how it defines key data, and how it 
collects, collates and manages the data. 
42 
20 The Department of Business and Innovation should 
undertake a thorough and robust review of its external and 
internal indicators related to Major Projects Victoria with 
the aim of: 
• developing new Budget Paper 3 measures that better 
represent actual performance 
• developing new internal indicators that provide Major 
Projects Victoria and the Department of Business and 
Innovation with a robust and reliable assessment of 
Major Projects Victoria’s performance 
• developing, documenting and using robust systems 
and processes to assess performance using Major 
Projects Victoria’s external and internal indicators 
• re-allocating responsibility for assessing performance, 
given failings with the current functions and 
responsibilities 
• establishing quality assurance mechanisms to oversee 
the performance assessment process to provide 
assurance about the process. 
52 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
21 The Department of Business and Innovation should, in 
light of the weaknesses identified with its internal and 
external performance indicators, review the major projects 
indicator in its Corporate Plan 2009–12. 
52 
22. The Department of Business and Innovation should 
establish quality assurance mechanisms over Major 
Projects Victoria to provide it with appropriate assurance 
around Major Projects Victoria’s processes to assess 
performance. 
52 
Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report or relevant extracts from 
the report was provided to the Department of Business and Innovation and the 
Department of Treasury and Finance with a request for submissions or comments. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments however, are included in Appendix E. 
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1  Background 
 
1.1 Major projects  
Investing in and delivering infrastructure is a core function of government. Investments 
are made to achieve economic, social and environmental outcomes, including 
increased productivity, access to services and improved service delivery, and 
improvements to the natural environment. 
Victoria’s infrastructure investment is significant. The Victorian Government estimates 
that the total value of current projects is around $35.6 billion, with expenditure of 
around $7.6 billion in 2013–14 alone. 
The Victorian Government’s 2006 Major Projects Governance Protocol provides 
guidance to support decisions about who is best placed to deliver major projects. The 
protocol indicates that major projects are generally those projects that meet at least 
one of the following criteria: 
• have a total estimated expenditure of over $100 million 
• are a public private partnership (PPP) 
• are rated as medium-high to high risk, based on project complexity. 
1.1.1 Managing major projects 
A range of public sector entities routinely deliver major projects in Victoria. These 
entities, and their typical projects, include: 
• VicRoads—road building and upgrades 
• Department of Transport—rail infrastructure and rolling stock, and port 
infrastructure 
• Department of Health—new and upgraded hospitals 
• Department of Justice—prisons, courts and police stations 
• Department of Human Services—public housing 
• Department of Sustainability and Environment—water infrastructure 
• Department of Education—schools. 
These departments and agencies tend to have in-house expertise to deliver their 
projects, given the routine nature of project delivery and their ‘pipeline’ of future 
projects. However, there are a range of departments and entities responsible for 
infrastructure projects that do not have the required in-house expertise to deliver them. 
These tend to be ‘one-off’ projects, such as sports or arts facilities.  
Background 
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Consequently, it is necessary for these entities to either contract in the required 
capability and resources, or contract out the responsibility for project delivery. In many 
cases, they outsource the delivery of these projects to Major Projects Victoria (MPV). 
1.2 Major Projects Victoria 
MPV was first established in 1987 as the Major Projects Unit within the Urban Lands 
Authority. Its purpose was to manage projects that involved the development and sale 
of government land from the then Minister for Housing. This reflected the government’s 
aim to promote the efficient use of Crown land. The Major Projects Unit was also 
responsible for major state projects that the government assigned to it. 
Since its establishment, MPV has functioned within six other departments. These are: 
• 1992—Department of Planning and Development, as Office of Major Projects 
• 1996—Department of Infrastructure 
• 1999—Department of State and Regional Development, as Major Projects 
Division from 2001 
• 2002—Department of Infrastructure, as Major Projects Victoria 
• 2008—Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development 
• 2010—Department of Business and Innovation. 
MPV’s role has changed over time. Between 2002–03 and 2006–07, its stated role 
was project implementation and delivery of complex property development and 
construction projects that the Premier assigned to it. 
Its role is now less focused on land development projects, and more on managing the 
delivery of infrastructure projects on behalf of other departments. MPV’s current stated 
role is to provide ‘expert project delivery services to Victorian Government departments 
and other agencies engaged in the delivery of complex, technically challenging and 
unique projects of state significance’. 
MPV has also actively focused its activities on areas such as working in regional 
Victoria, housing affordability, tourism and ecologically sustainable development. 
1.2.1 Governance  
MPV is a business unit within the Department of Business and Innovation (DBI). It has 
three operational areas and uses both contract and Victorian public service (VPS) staff 
to deliver its functions. 
Project Management Group 
The Project Management Group is responsible for delivering design and construction 
projects. These are traditional construction projects and represent the majority of 
MPV’s work, in terms of time expended. This group delivers projects on behalf of other 
departments, including its own. Recent examples include the Arts Centre (Hamer Hall) 
and the Melbourne Park (tennis centre) redevelopment. 
Background 
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Property and Land Development Group 
The Property and Land Development Group is responsible for managing MPV’s land 
development projects. This type of project typically involves sale of land to, or joint 
venture arrangements with, the private sector. 
This group’s activities reflect MPV’s primary focus at its inception. Recent projects 
include the Kew Residential Services (Kew Cottages) and Flinders Street Station 
Redesign Competition. 
Partnerships Victoria Group 
The Partnerships Victoria Group is responsible for managing PPPs under the 
Partnerships Victoria framework. The activities of this group represent a relatively small 
part of MPV’s project work, given it does not deliver many PPPs. Recent projects 
include the Biosciences Research Centre and the Melbourne Convention Centre 
development. 
Human resources 
MPV has 44 VPS staff (42.2 full-time equivalent) and what it considers 13 independent 
contractors. It has relied on this mix of staff to manage the delivery of projects since its 
establishment, although the ratio of employees to independent contractors has 
changed over time. Figure 1A shows the number of employees and contractors for the 
past ten years. 
  Figure 1A
Major Projects Victoria employees and contractors, 2002–03 to 2011–12 
Year Employees  
Long-term 
contractors 
Short-term 
contractors Total 
2002–03 30 3 10 43 
2003–04 54 6 12 72 
2004–05 108 9 12 129 
2005–06 86 10 12 108 
2006–07 102 10 11 123 
2007–08 33 9 10 52 
2008–09 32 9 10 51 
2009–10 36 11 9 56 
2010–11 37 11 6 54 
2011–12 34 10 9 53 
2012–13 30 8 5 43 
Note: The substantially higher number of employees in the years 2004–05 to 2006–07 was due 
to the Synchrotron project. Major Project Victoria’s longer-term contractors typically have 
contracts of two years or more. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from Major Projects Victoria. 
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VPS employees perform a range of roles, including project director, manager and 
officer, as well as contract and technical manager. They also perform MPV’s business 
and finance roles. Contractors typically perform project director and project manager 
roles, but also perform senior management roles. The directors of each operational 
group are non-VPS contractors. 
Funding 
MPV generates its funding primarily through project management fees that it charges 
client agencies. The fees are based on invoiced work rather than a set percentage of a 
project's costs. MPV operates on a 100 per cent cost recovery model, which means 
that it needs to cover all costs including human resource, accommodation and 
corporate costs. For 2011–12, MPV estimated its costs at around $11.6 million, which 
consists of: 
• $8.1 million in salaries and on-costs, with employee costs of $4.4 million, and 
contractor costs of $3.7 million 
• $3.3 million in administration costs 
• $0.47 million in corporate charges, including $.02 million for election commitment 
savings, and $0.13 million in Budget and Expenditure Review Committee savings 
• $0.2 million in rebates from CenITex. 
In addition to the project management fee, MPV also receives annual funding through 
a DBI allocation. MPV uses this funding for projects and activities it undertakes where 
it cannot charge a project management fee, such as business cases and feasibility 
studies. Figure 1B shows MPV’s historical operating budget, based on its business 
plans, as well as the DBI allocation.  
  Figure 1B
Operating budget and actual, 2002–03 to 2011–12 ($ millions) 
Year 
Operating 
budget 
DBI 
allocation  
Total 
budget  
Operating 
budget 
actual  
DBI 
allocation 
actual 
Total 
actual  Difference 
2002–03 n.a 1.2 n.a 5.0 0.8 5.8 n.a 
2003–04 n.a 1.5 n.a 14.1 0.9 15.0 n.a 
2004–05 n.a 1.5 n.a 14.2 1.2 15.4 n.a 
2005–06 n.a 1.4 n.a 12.9 1.2 14.1 n.a 
2006–07 12.1 1.2 13.3 13.3 0.9 14.2 –0.9 
2007–08 8.9 1.3 10.2 8.3 0.8 9.1 1.1 
2008–09 10.5 1.6 12.1 10.1 0.7 10.8 1.3 
2009–10 11.1 1.9 13.0 10.1 1.0 11.1 1.9 
2010–11 11.5 1.8 13.3 10.4 1.3 11.7 1.6 
2011–12 11.6 1.6 13.2 n.a 1.3 n.a – 
Note: Operating budgets were not included in Major Project Victoria’s business plans before  
2006–07, and only actuals are available. ‘n.a’ refers to information that is not available. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from Major Projects Victoria. 
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1.2.2 Managing major projects 
MPV is currently managing 17 projects. This includes six infrastructure (capital) 
projects, three property and land development projects—two long standing and one 
new—as well as a range of other non-capital projects. Figure 1C shows that of the 
six infrastructure projects, two are nearing completion, while a further two have just 
started. Appendix D contains a list of all MPV projects completed between 2000 and 
2012. This includes around 19 capital and property and land development projects. 
  Figure 1C
Current Major Projects Victoria projects, July 2012 
Project Type Client agency 
Avalon Fuel Line Feasibility Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Aviation Training College Feasibility Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Flinders Street Station 
Design Competition 
Feasibility Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Port of Hastings Feasibility Department of Transport 
Biosciences research 
Centre 
Capital (PPP)(a) Department of Primary Industries/ 
LaTrobe University 
State Sports Facilities 
Project 
Capital(a) Department of Planning and 
Community Development 
FOLD Facilities Project Capital(b) Metropolitan Fire Brigade 
Shrine Redevelopment Capital(b) Department of Planning and 
Community Development 
Melbourne Markets 
Relocation 
Capital Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Melbourne Park 
Redevelopment 
Capital Department of Planning and 
Community Development 
E-Gate Property and Land 
Development 
Department of Transport and 
Department of Planning and 
Community Development 
Kew Residential Services Property and Land 
Development 
Department of Human Services 
Parkville Gardens 
Residential Development 
Property and Land 
Development 
Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Trainshed Way 
Development 
Advice Department of Planning and 
Community Development 
Victorian Freight Strategy Advice Department of Transport 
Docklands Film and TV 
upgrade 
Oversight Department of Business and 
Innovation 
Sustainability Guidelines Internal Department of Business and 
Innovation 
(a) These projects are nearing completion. 
(b) These projects have just started. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from Major Projects Victoria. 
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Responsibilities and accountabilities 
In managing the delivery of projects for public sector entities, the Major Projects 
Governance Protocol outlines the respective responsibilities and accountabilities of 
MPV and its client entities. 
The Minister for Major Projects becomes accountable for the delivery of the project 
where the Governor in Council nominates a project. The portfolio minister—who 
oversees the client entity—is responsible for the achievement of project outcomes. 
At an operational level, the protocol details the various project stages and identifies 
responsibilities for each element of the stages. This includes identifying whether the 
client entity or MPV is responsible, involved, endorses or advises. Client entities are 
typically responsible for the early planning stages, such as feasibility and business 
case development. MPV typically has greater responsibility at the latter stages, 
including procurement, managing construction and making the infrastructure 
operational. The Major Projects Victoria Governance Protocol is included in Appendix A 
of this report. 
Project management framework 
MPV manages the delivery of projects under an in-house project management 
framework. First implemented within MPV in 2008, the framework provides guidance 
on MPV’s project management activities throughout the project lifecycle, and details 
processes and procedures for project staff to follow. It describes mandatory 
requirements and standard information that project staff should include in plans, while 
allowing flexibility and customisation of plans from project to project.  
1.3 Regulatory framework 
Public Administration Act 2004 
The Public Administration Act 2004 underpins the work of the Victorian public sector. 
Parliament enacted it to provide a framework for good governance and public 
administration.  
Among its many aims, the Public Administration Act 2004 aims to achieve a public 
sector that is effective, efficient and accountable, and achieves the highest standards 
of governance and integrity. Supporting these aims are public sector values: 
• Responsiveness—providing frank, impartial and timely advice, providing 
high-quality services and identifying and promoting best practice 
• Integrity—being honest, open and transparent, using powers responsibly and 
avoiding conflicts of interest 
• Impartiality—decisions and advice are merit based and not because of bias, 
favouritism or self-interest, and acting fairly and objectively 
• Accountability—working transparently, accepting responsibility, achieving the 
best use of resources and submitting oneself to appropriate scrutiny 
• Respect—fair and equitable treatment  
Background 
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• Leadership—implementing, promoting and supporting the Public Administration 
Act 2004 values 
• Human rights—decisions and advice are consistent with human rights. 
Project Development and Construction Management Act 1994 
MPV operates predominantly under the Project Development and Construction 
Management Act 1994 (the Act), along with Ministerial Directions for tendering and 
contracting in public construction.  
The primary purpose of the Act is to facilitate development projects in Victoria. Under 
the Act, the Premier is able to recommend to the Governor in Council that certain 
projects be ‘nominated’. It also enables the DBI Secretary, as a body corporate, to 
delegate powers to the head of MPV. 
By nominating a project, the Act provides MPV with broad powers relating to acquiring 
land, and restrictions on the use of the land. These powers include: 
• MPV being granted Crown land 
• requiring public bodies to surrender or divest land to the Crown 
• acquiring land compulsorily and also by agreement  
• opening, realigning or closing roads 
• overriding easements, covenants and other registrable restrictions, subject to 
some conditions, from any land. 
In addition, the Act also provides MPV, through delegation from the DBI Secretary, with 
extensive powers to enter into contracts and agreements to enable it to perform its 
functions. These core functions include: 
• facilitating and managing public construction for departments and public bodies 
• providing consultancies, information and advice to departments and public bodies 
• providing advice and information to the Minister for Major Projects. 
Ministerial Directions 
As MPV is involved with public construction, it is also bound by both Ministerial 
Direction No.1: Tendering Provisions for Public Construction, and Ministerial Direction 
No. 2: Contractual Provisions for Public Construction.  
The Directions outline minimum requirements and processes for obtaining quotes for 
construction work, and also for entering into contracts for building and construction 
works, and consultancy services. 
1.4 Recent developments with major projects 
High-value, high-risk projects 
A range of major projects have experienced significant time and cost overruns—most 
of which are not MPV projects. In response, the government has introduced new 
processes for the planning and delivery of major projects that it considers high value 
and high risk. Managed through the Department of Treasury and Finance, the new 
Background 
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process requires greater centralised oversight of projects that have a total estimated 
investment of $100 million or more, and/or planning processes identify them as high 
risk. This includes a requirement to obtain the Treasurer’s approval of project 
documentation at key stages of the project’s life cycle, as well as compulsory Gateway 
Reviews. 
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
In addition to the introduction of high-value and high-risk project oversight, the 
Victorian Parliament’s Public Accounts and Estimates Committee (PAEC) is conducting 
an Inquiry into Effective Decision Making for the Successful Delivery of Significant 
Infrastructure Projects. The inquiry’s terms of reference focus on the competencies and 
skills to deliver major projects and the management of projects.  
This audit was originally scheduled for completion in 2013–14. However, after a 
request from PAEC, the audit was rescheduled to both inform and complement PAEC’s 
current infrastructure inquiry. 
1.5 Audit objective and scope 
The audit objective was to assess how effective, efficient and economical MPV is in 
managing major capital projects. To address the objective, the audit examined the 
projects that MPV manages, and whether frameworks were in place that enable MPV 
to assess and report performance and demonstrate value-for-money. 
Specifically, the audit examined whether: 
• projects that MPV delivers meet time, cost, scope and quality outputs and 
outcomes, consistent with industry standards 
• MPV identifies and addresses the reasons why projects do not meet project 
management and performance expectations 
• MPV was able to monitor and assess its performance and cost effectiveness, and 
whether it routinely reported to MPV and DBI management  
• performance measures were relevant, appropriate, fairly represent actual 
performance and demonstrated value-for-money. 
The audit also examined MPV’s role and purpose, project management systems and 
contracted human resources. 
1.6 Audit method and cost 
The audit was performed in accordance with section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and the 
Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards. 
The total cost was $355 000. 
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2  Role and governance 
At a glance 
Background  
Major Projects Victoria (MPV) has considerable power to perform its functions. This 
includes having projects assigned to it, and the ability to charge a project management 
fee. To balance MPV’s position and powers, there is a need for effective governance 
and strong accountability.  
Conclusion 
MPV is not being effectively governed. It has provided questionable information around 
employment matters to Parliament and there are major deficiencies with the way MPV 
manages internal contracts.  
Findings  
• MPV’s recruitment practices enable employees to resign and to be re-engaged 
as contractors within a very short time frame to perform the same work at a much 
higher fee—this lacks integrity and transparency. 
• MPV’s management of its internal contracts is deficient, with missing contracts, 
unjustified contract variations and the absence of contractor performance 
assessment. 
• MPV provides contractors with the authority to approve payments, which conflicts 
with Standing Directions made under the Financial Management Act 1994. There 
is consequently uncertainty about MPV’s authority for this approach. 
Recommendations 
Major Projects Victoria should: 
• review its contract management practices and implement practices that are 
consistent, at a minimum, with the processes and policies that the Victorian 
Government Purchasing Board has established 
• undertake an independent fraud risk assessment, particularly around contract 
management and payment systems, given the weaknesses in controls. 
Role and governance 
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2.1 Introduction 
Major Projects Victoria (MPV) is a unique entity. While it is a business unit within the 
Department of Business and Innovation (DBI), it operates more as a consultancy or 
separate entity. It has its own financial systems and operates under legislation that, by 
delegations, gives it considerable power to perform its functions. This includes having 
projects assigned to it, and the ability to charge a project management fee. 
MPV’s unique position and powers require accountability and transparency. This 
includes fulfilling its role and functions, supported by sound administrative and 
governance arrangements. MPV must also be able to demonstrate that its services 
provide value-for-money. 
2.2 Conclusion 
MPV is not being effectively governed. While it is broadly performing its property 
development and project management roles consistent with the functions outlined in 
the Project Development and Construction Management Act 1994, significant other 
issues exist. These issues include conflicts with Standing Directions made under the 
Financial Management Act 1994, by providing its contractors with financial 
authorisations. It is not complying with the Public Records Act 1973, given the 
deficiencies in its record keeping. Through its involvement in Parliamentary committee 
inquiries, MPV and DBI may have misinformed Parliament, undermining Parliamentary 
processes.  
There are also major deficiencies with the way MPV manages internal contracts, with 
missing contracts, variations without adequate reason or assessment of performance, 
and questionable recruitment practices. This maladministration diminishes 
accountability and transparency, and increases the risk of error and fraud.  
2.3 Role and function 
A key element of sound governance is the effective, efficient and economical 
performance of an entity’s role and functions. Demonstrating that a public sector entity 
is doing what it says it will do adds to its accountability.  
At a broad level, the Project Development and Construction Management Act 1994 
outlines MPV’s core functions as a facilitating agency, which are: 
• facilitate and manage public construction for departments and public bodies 
• provide consultancies, information and advice to departments and public bodies 
• provide advice and information to the Minister for Major Projects. 
In addition to the legislative functions, MPV also determines its role through its 
planning processes, and particularly its annual business plans.  
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MPV is generally undertaking its specified legislated functions. However, MPV’s focus 
appears to be the delivery of a relatively small number of high-value capital projects 
and a large number of small, planning-related, projects rather than what might 
reasonably be described as ‘major projects’.  
2.3.1 Business planning 
MPV has had documented business plans for at least the past 10 years. These plans 
outline MPV’s mission and vision, which relate to MPV providing leadership in project 
management services and project delivery. They also outline the various roles that 
MPV considers it could perform. 
Over time, the focus of MPV’s role has changed. When it was established, the primary 
focus was on construction of public buildings and the development of surplus land. 
MPV now considers its key role is to ‘provide expert project delivery services to 
Victorian Government departments and other agencies engaged in the delivery of 
complex, technically challenging, and unique projects of state significance’.  
MPV’s more recent business plans identify the key role of taking a leadership role in 
public sector project management. Specifically, the leadership role was expected to 
occur through the Project Management Leadership Forum—where leaders from the 
public and private sector participate in high-level discussions and workshops on topics 
of interest for the industry.  
MPV is not adequately performing this leadership role. It no longer leads or 
participates in the Project Management Leadership Forum, and it is unclear what other 
mechanisms MPV uses to provide leadership, let alone assess its effectiveness as a 
sector leader. 
MPV advised that it demonstrates leadership through a range of seminars and 
conferences. The seminars are focused on people sharing their views on what makes 
a good leader, rather than being a forum where MPV demonstrates its major project 
leadership. Similarly, its involvement in conferences is more indicative of participation 
rather than leadership. Industry research is a key part of being effective, efficient and 
economical. It provides a framework to understand what better practices are, to 
compare current practices to better practice and to change operating processes if its 
practices should be improved. Research may also enable innovation and leadership in 
certain areas.  
A research role was in place at MPV for around two years, until 2011–12. MPV 
determined a research role was necessary to fill important gaps in industry knowledge 
and identified an ongoing focus on ‘continuing to develop initiatives that promote MPV 
as an expert within its field by providing research-based working papers and 
undertaking other research tasks’.  
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MPV has discontinued this role. The lack of focus on industry research is a missed 
opportunity and means that MPV is not in a position to adequately understand industry 
trends and innovations, and consolidate and share this knowledge. Nor is it in a 
position to adequately understand whether its project management fees are consistent 
with those in the private sector and whether it is providing value-for-money services.  
Strategic plan 
In 2009, MPV developed a four-year strategic plan as part of its business planning 
processes. Strategic planning is an effective way for an entity to take a more 
considered and longer-term view to achieving its objectives and vision. MPV’s strategic 
plan detailed a range of actions in relation to policy and corporate priorities, and 
detailed its projects for the four years. 
MPV advised that it stopped using its strategic plan after one year, following the 
election of the current government. Rather than stop using the plan, MPV should have 
updated it to reflect different priorities. Consequently, MPV is without a fundamental 
planning document that aids effective governance. 
2.3.2 Project focus 
MPV is intended to deliver mostly large and complex projects. However, our 
assessment of the work it manages suggests that the projects it manages typically are 
not major projects as envisaged by the 2006 governance protocol. Rather, it manages 
many smaller projects whose complexity, uniqueness or state significance is not 
obvious.  
Major Projects Victoria’s project types  
Between 2000 and 2012, MPV expects to deliver 98 projects. These include capital 
projects, property and land developments and feasibility and advisory projects. A 
complete list is included in Appendix B. Over this time period, MPV has managed:  
• thirty-one capital projects, of which three were public private partnerships 
• eight property development projects 
• fifty-nine ‘other’ projects, which included: 
• thirty-one feasibility studies 
• seventeen advice projects 
• four oversight projects 
• three ‘internal’ projects 
• two maintenance projects 
• one administration project 
• one decontamination project. 
Of the 98 projects undertaken, 80 are completed and 17 are current, with the status of 
one project—the Melbourne Exhibition Centre Stage 2—uncertain. Figure 1C in Part 1 
of this report outlined MPV’s current projects, the type of project (as MPV defined 
them) and the client agency. Of the 17 current projects: 
• four are capital projects—two of which are nearly complete  
• four are feasibility studies 
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• three are property and land development projects—one new and two 
longstanding 
• two are potential capital projects 
• two are advisory 
• one is internal—MPV-generated work 
• one is oversight. 
Of note, seven of the projects have DBI—MPV’s overseeing department—as the client 
agency. This creates a situation where MPV is its own client. Situations like this, if not 
managed adequately, can lead to project governance issues that can undermine 
projects. We discuss this issue in Part 3 in relation to the recently completed Princes 
Pier project. 
Major Projects Victoria’s other roles 
In addition to its range of roles that include delivering capital projects to providing 
advice, MPV’s role extends to other areas that have little apparent ongoing connection 
to its role or functions as a deliverer of major projects. Many of these are legacy roles. 
Restaurant leases 
MPV is the lessor of three restaurants in Port Melbourne, originating from its role in 
developing Beacon Cove. As part of the development, restaurants were constructed 
and long-term leases entered into. These leases are for up to 99 years, if each 20-year 
extension is granted. The leases strongly favour lease renewal.  
MPV is in the process of transferring responsibility for the leases to the City of Port 
Phillip. 
Princes Pier 
As part of the Beacon Cove development, MPV took ownership of the Princes Pier and 
surrounding land in Port Melbourne. MPV is responsible for the ongoing maintenance 
of these assets, and funding to do this is currently being sourced from unspent 
Expenditure Review Committee allocations. Long-term funding for maintenance of the 
pier is uncertain, and attempts to transfer ownership to a more appropriate entity have 
been unsuccessful. 
William Barak Bridge 
The William Barak Bridge links Birrarung Marr to the Melbourne Cricket Ground. MPV 
took ownership of the asset after it was built. Like the Princes Pier, it is responsible for 
maintaining the asset, and has been unsuccessful in transferring ownership to a more 
appropriate entity. Funding for long-term maintenance is also uncertain. 
Regent Theatre Management Company 
MPV has a representative on the board for the Regent Theatre Management 
Company. The management company, which also comprises members from the City of 
Melbourne, oversees the lease for the Regent Theatre. This role originated from MPV’s 
involvement in redeveloping the theatre. 
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Yarra Maritime Reserve 
MPV performs the role of committee of management for the Yarra Maritime Reserve, 
as part of the Convention Centre development. 
2.3.3 Reviewing Major Projects Victoria’s role 
In October 2007, Cabinet’s Major Projects Committee requested the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet (DPC) to coordinate a review, and report about the delivery of 
major projects in Victoria. A specific focus of the review was the future role of MPV and 
its functions.  
The review was undertaken by the Major Projects Review Committee, which was 
established with representatives from DPC, the Department of Treasury and Finance 
(DTF), MPV and the Department of Primary Industries. 
While the review was intended to examine MPV’s functions, it focused more on MPV’s 
role in relation to the broader system, and how its role could be clarified and expanded. 
The review identified a range of proposed changes to MPV’s functions. Many of these 
were significant and would have made MPV the main project delivery agency across 
the Victorian public sector, as well as performing a key leadership role. There was no 
apparent assessment of MPV’s capability to take on these new roles, as the review did 
not assess MPV’s performance in its role.  
The review recommended that MPV’s role should be expanded so that it: 
• was a centre of major projects excellence within government, and took a 
leadership role in strengthening project management capability and careers 
across government 
• acted as a central point of information for government and the private sector, and 
as an interface between the two 
• acted as a resource for central agencies, line agencies, and external 
stakeholders on major projects issues, such as through assisting with business 
case analysis and project scheduling and prioritisation.  
Specifically, the review proposed that MPV undertake the following functions: 
• a leadership role in developing project management specialists, industry 
knowledge, project review and risk assessments 
• a supporting role in whole-of-government project coordination, business case 
development and project performance reporting. 
While MPV drafted a Cabinet submission proposing that the recommendations be 
accepted, it was never completed. Consequently, no action has taken place in relation 
to the review. 
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2.4 Project human resources 
Infrastructure projects often require a broad range of skills at different times throughout 
the project. Maintaining this skillset on a payroll may not be financially viable, 
particularly if there is not a known and regular stream of projects planned. In situations 
such as this, using a mix of employees and contractors can provide the required skills 
in a flexible way—if managed appropriately. 
To perform its role, MPV uses a mix of employees and what it considers independent 
contractors. It has used this approach since its inception in 1987. However, its current 
approach has significant deficiencies, lacks accountability and transparency, and does 
not represent value-for-money. Fundamental weaknesses exist with its contract 
management, and it is uncertain whether MPVs staff are in fact employees in both the 
legal and practical sense. 
2.4.1 Employment 
The use of contractors for publicly-funded projects is a legitimate function of any public 
sector entity. However, there needs to be a sound rationale for using a contractor over 
an existing public sector employee. While contractors can provide an entity with 
flexibility by allowing for alternative length and conditions of the engagement, the cost 
of contractors can often be much higher than public sector employees. This additional 
cost is ultimately borne by taxpayers. 
At a minimum, the entity engaging the contractor must first assess the need for a 
contractor, as well as the capability and capacity within the public sector.  
In response to the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee’s 2011 question on why 
a public sector employee or equivalent could not undertake the work, DBI stated that 
‘the work requires a skill and remuneration level currently not available within the 
Victorian Public Service’. 
Contractors 
MPV currently has what it considers to be 13 independent contractors performing a 
range of functions related to infrastructure projects. These functions include three 
senior management roles, and five project director and manager roles.  
Of the 13 contractors, MPV consider eight to be long term and five short term. The 
average length of long-term contracts is around four years, although this ranges from 
two and a half years to nine years. MPV short-term contracts range from four months 
to 17 months. 
Despite DBI’s advice to Parliament, there is no documentation within MPV that 
demonstrates an assessment of the need for any of its contractors, or any assessment 
of the capability and capacity within the public sector. The limited information MPV was 
able to provide around its appointment of contractors suggests that in most situations 
contractors are the only option considered. 
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Indeed, there is strong evidence to contradict DBI’s statement about the availability of 
public sector employees. This raises questions about the veracity of the information 
provided by DBI to Parliament.  
Within MPV’s current contractors, we identified four who were working for MPV as 
public sector employees a very short time before they were appointed as contractors. 
For example: 
• An employee resigned in December 2005, with MPV engaging them as a 
contractor in 2006. Precise dates are unknown due to a lack of documentation. 
Since 2006, MPV has paid this contractor around $1.67 million in contract fees. 
• An employee resigned in October 2009, and was engaged as a contractor by 
MPV in the same month to provide the same services. The contract was for an 
estimated cost of $903 000 over three years.  
• Another employee resigned in December 2009 and was engaged by MPV on a 
short-term contract in January 2010. The contractor was then engaged by other 
entities to provide services for projects that MPV was involved in. In December 
2010, MPV re-engaged the contractor on three different contracts to the value of 
$196 000 over an 18-month period.  
• A fourth employee resigned in March 2010 and in April 2010 was engaged by 
MPV on a three-year contract to provide the same services. The estimated cost 
of the contract is $816 000. 
This process of resigning from MPV and being re-engaged soon after to perform the 
same work at a much higher pay rate lacks integrity and transparency.  
DBI advised that these examples reflect the evolution of project roles as projects 
progress. It stated that ‘At a point in time, MPV may judge that a project that is 
currently led by a VPS staff member at level VPS 6 or 7 is now of sufficient complexity 
as to require the services of a more senior project director. When this role is 
advertised, the incumbent project manager may apply for it and be considered 
alongside other applicants. This occurred in three of the four cases identified in the 
report’. 
Based on MPV’s advice, this means that in at least three cases MPV considered the 
incumbent VPS staff member did not have the skills to manage the complexities of 
their projects and that these skills needed to be procured through contracted services. 
Three incumbents were allowed to submit a proposal, and were successful in being 
appointed to the more complex role despite an apparent earlier assessment of a skill 
deficit. 
At a minimum, MPV’s contractor appointment process raises questions around the 
impartiality of the selection processes, particularly where previous line managers made 
decisions around the preferred candidates.  
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MPV also advised that there was a competitive contractor selection process for each of 
the ex-employees, However, there is a lack of documentation to demonstrate that a 
competitive process was used. Assessment of the available evidence shows that: 
• for the first ex-employee, there is only a memorandum highlighting that an 
appointment process was entered into 
• for the second ex-employee, there is evidence that 52 people applied, but only 
two internal MPV candidates were interviewed and both were successful  
• for the third ex-employee, there is no information that indicates a competitive 
process—rather, the available information indicates that the ex-employee was the 
only candidate considered 
• for the fourth ex-employee, there was only a memorandum discussing the results 
of a selection process. 
Given the nature of MPV’s contractor appointment processes, it is not evident that 
public sector probity standards and any potential or perceived conflicts of interest were 
identified and appropriately addressed during selection processes. Despite MPV 
regularly engaging contractors, it does not have a conflict of interest policy. It advised 
that it uses the DBI policy, however, this has only been in place since 2011. 
Employment status 
The way that MPV manages its staff, and has managed staff in the past, raises 
significant uncertainty as to their employment status. Whether a person is a contractor 
or an employee depends on a range of factors.  
A genuine independent contractor will typically be autonomous rather than subservient 
in its decision-making; financially self-reliant rather than economically dependent upon 
the business of another; and generating profit rather than simply a payment for time, 
skill and effort provided. 
In the case of MPV very few, if any, of their contractors appear to meet these criteria. 
With the possible exception of one or two short-term contractors, the remaining 
contractors are in subservient decision-making positions, and are economically 
dependent on MPV.  
They are also heavily integrated within MPV, using its premises and equipment to 
conduct their business. In the case of the three group directors, each is entitled to 
annual public sector executive officer salary increases and/or bonuses. These three 
group directors, along with the executive director, make up MPV’s senior management 
team. 
While determining the employment status of staff requires a case-by-case assessment, 
based on the evidence collected for this audit, MPV’s contractors satisfy a number of 
criteria that would suggest they are, in fact, employees at law.  
If MPV’s contractors are, at law, employees, then DBI may be financially liable to past 
and present contractors for unpaid leave entitlements. MPV has never sought legal 
advice on this issue.  
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Departmental employees are entitled to four weeks annual leave each year, and 
13 weeks long service leave for every 10 years of service. The department is required 
to recognise a liability for any annual leave or long service leave owed to employees. 
In addition, there are other costs involved in hiring an employee such as fringe benefits 
tax, Workcover, training and payroll tax costs that DBI may be liable for. Given the 
value and length of some contracts, this liability could be significant. 
Public sector salary structures 
Private sector rates for equivalent work in the public sector are often considerably 
higher. In some situations, this may limit an entity’s ability to employ someone within 
the public sector salary structures.  
DPC sets limits on the number of executive officers within each department, although 
there is some flexibility to alter this depending on need. Based on the contract cost 
information provided by MPV, all of the current contract costs could be accommodated 
within the VPS executive officer salary structures.  
While MPV may not have these positions available, it is not evident that it has ever 
sought DPC approval to create additional executive officer positions and, therefore, fit 
its contractors within its salary structure. Doing this may reduce the existing uncertainty 
around the employment status of its staff. 
2.4.2 Contract management 
Effectively managing contracts is a fundamental aspect of good governance. It 
provides appropriate checks and balances so that there is assurance that the services 
are being provided, the contractor is performing according to the contract, and there is 
efficient and economical use of public funds. 
MPV’s management of its internal contracts is seriously deficient. There are multiple 
weaknesses with most of the contracts that have occurred through MPV’s 
maladministration. The absence of appropriate checks and balances means that there 
is likely to be an increased risk of fraud. While DBI has a fraud risk register that 
includes generic fraud risks for MPV, this is not based on the findings in this audit 
around the weak controls and needs to be revised. 
A detailed assessment of weaknesses with MPV’s management of its current contracts 
is included in Appendix C. The following is a summary of the key issues. 
Missing contracts 
MPV has engaged 13 contractors using 15 contracts. As part of this audit, it was only 
able to locate 10 documented contracts—it has no record of the other five contracts. 
Together, these five missing contracts have an estimated value of around $1 million.  
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Contract variations 
MPV regularly varies contracts for both time and cost. Of the current contracts, six 
have a total of 14 variations. There is very little documentation to support the reason 
for the variations. Further, MPV were unable to explain the basis for extensions to 
contract length or revised payment terms.  
MPV has not assessed the performance of any contractor prior to agreeing to any of 
the contract variations. It is not evident that anything has been done by MPV or DBI to 
satisfy themselves that the contractor has performed according to the terms of the 
contract, and that their performance was to an acceptable standard. This is despite 
most contracts containing performance standards. One contract was varied four times 
over 17 months, however, MPV did not have a documented contract.  
There is also poor oversight of contract variations. One of MPV’s contractors has been 
on a contract for nine years, with four variations. The third variation occurred in 
June 2011 with DBI’s Secretary approving an extension of time on the condition that 
MPV went to tender for the contract upon expiry. In December 2011, the contract was 
varied again for a further 12 months at a cost of $378 000. 
Contract terms 
Two of MPV’s contractors are appointed on open-ended contracts. The reasons for this 
are not known because MPV does not have copies of the contracts, nor adequate 
supporting information. In a draft memo to DBI’s Secretary in March 2012, MPV noted 
that the two contractors were ‘…currently employed at MPV under open agreements 
with no end date. As the limits under which their services were contracted have now 
been exceeded, MPV considers it preferable to have a fixed-term contract going 
forward’. In the absence of contracts, it is unclear how MPV knew the contract terms or 
that the contract costs had been exceeded. With MPV indicating that these contractors 
should move to fixed-term contracts, it is unclear on what basis it has demonstrated an 
ongoing need for the contractors to manage projects, or the need for the contractors 
rather than VPS staff.  
One contract provided the contractor, through a variation, with the option to extend the 
contract for a further two years. No conditions were placed on the option to extend, 
and it appears that it provided the contractor with the sole discretion to vary the 
contract. This was done without any performance assessment. The contractor again 
exercised an option to extend the contract for a further eight months. This second 
option is not included in any contract documentation. Based on available 
documentation, it appears that there was no authority to extend for the further term. 
Several of the contracts, and particularly those developed to engage senior MPV 
management, include contract terms that state the contractor is not an employee. 
However, these same contracts provide the contractors with similar benefits to those 
typically available only to public sector employees, such as annual executive officer 
salary increases and executive officer performance bonuses. At a minimum, this 
further increases the likelihood that the contractors are, in fact, employees at law. 
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Contract payments 
There is a difference between the expected cost of some contracts and the actual cost, 
based on recorded payments. For the two contractors with missing open-ended 
contracts, it is not possible to determine what they should be paid. Other MPV 
information indicated that their current contracts started in April 2010, although the 
actual dates are uncertain. Based on its tender submissions, we conservatively 
estimated the value of their current contracts at around $340 000 and $280 000 
per annum, respectively. However, comparison with actual cost data shows the two 
contractors had been paid $1.67 million since June 2006, and $1.08 million since 
April 2007, respectively.  
Two other MPV contractors appear to have been paid $113 000 and $56 000 over their 
expected contract cost. MPV advised that this is because of clauses in its contracts 
that allow for annual adjustments in their fees, in line with DBI’s executive officers. For 
the contractor that has been paid an additional $113 000, this amounts to around 
$22 600 each year, or 9.8 per cent of the yearly fee. For the other contractor, this 
amounts to $9 300 each year, or 3.3 per cent of the yearly fee. 
Contract reporting 
MPV is required to publish details of its contracts valued over $100 000 on the 
Victorian Government’s contracts website. This provides some transparency around 
public sector contracting. 
There are discrepancies between what is reported on the contracts website and the 
information that MPV has provided to us during this audit. Contracts for two 
contractors, totalling around $2.7 million in contract costs over a six-year period are not 
reported on the contracts website. 
2.5 Complying with legislation 
Departmental heads are responsible for the general conduct and the effective, efficient 
and economical management of the department’s activities and functions. This 
includes complying with legislation and policies that it is responsible for, and which 
apply to it. 
While MPV does not have its own legislation, in performing its functions it is required to 
adhere to a range of other legislation. These include the Project Development and 
Construction Management Act 1994 (PDCMA), the Financial Management Act 1994 
(FMA) and the Public Records Act 1973. 
MPV is complying with the key provisions of the PDCMA, particularly in terms of 
nominating projects and establishing delegations in a manner consistent with the 
legislation. However, it is uncertain whether MPV is complying with Standing Directions 
relating to authorisation of payments, made under the FMA. It is not complying with the 
PRA, given the deficiencies identified with the way it manages public records. 
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2.5.1 Delegations 
Under the PDCMA, as a body corporate DBI’s Secretary can delegate any of his 
functions and powers related to a nominated project—except for any of the delegated 
powers—to anyone within the department. Delegating can provide a range of 
operational efficiencies and is standard practice across Victoria’s public sector under 
various legislation.  
Within DBI, the secretary has delegated his powers, and the power to sub-delegate, to 
the Executive Director of MPV. The executive director has subsequently sub-delegated 
powers to two ‘classes of persons’ within MPV—directors and project directors. This 
has occurred in accordance with the PDCMA.  
The delegated powers include those relating to entering into contracts for contractors 
and consultants, varying these contracts and approving payments related to the 
contracts. Figure 2A shows the various ‘classes’, the applicable function and the 
financial limits that the delegations impose. 
  Figure 2A
Major Projects Victoria’s sub-delegations and financial limits  
 Function 
Position 
Approve 
payments 
($mil) 
Approve 
contractors 
($mil) 
Approve 
consultants 
($mil) 
Approve 
variations–
contractors 
($mil) 
Approve 
variations–
consultants 
($mil) 
Approve 
contracts–
administrative 
($mil) 
Director,  
Project Management 
5.0 1.0 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.10 
Director,  
Partnerships Victoria 
2.0 0.5 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.10 
Director,  
Property and Land 
2.0 0.5 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.10 
Project Director 2.0 0.5 0.10 0.05 0.02 – 
Manager,  
Finance and IT 
– – – – – 0.02 
Manager,  
Business and Executive 
– – – – – 0.02 
Executive Assistant/ 
Administration Manager 
– – – – – 0.005 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on data from Major Projects Victoria. 
These delegations are documented and reflected in MPV’s financial systems. 
However, the delegated power to approve payments conflicts with the Standing 
Directions made under the FMA, if the delegates are indeed contractors. 
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Financial Management Act and Standing Directions 
FMA is a key piece of Victorian legislation, dealing with financial management and 
accountability within the public sector. This includes financial responsibility, budget 
management, supply management and financial reporting. Supporting the FMA are 
Standing Directions of the Minister for Finance. These Directions have legislative force 
and public sector entities must comply with them.  
Standing Direction 2.4 deals with authorisations—the ability to approve payments. This 
Direction explicitly excludes contractors and consultants from holding an authorisation, 
and notes that only employees can hold these authorisations. 
Within MPV, all the director positions listed in Figure 2A are held by what MPV 
considers to be independent contractors and similarly, four of MPV’s seven project 
director roles are held by what MPV considers to be independent contractors.  
The conflict between the delegations and the Standing Directions means it is uncertain 
whether DBI is complying with the Standing Directions. Neither DBI nor MPV has 
sought specific legal advice on this issue.  
While DBI provided us with legal advice it received in 2008 that it claims addresses this 
issue, we do not consider that the advice includes a clearly stated position on 
authorisations under the Standing Directions. Its primary focus was the status of 
delegations following a machinery of government change, and in particular settling 
issues around the secretary as a body corporate. In relation to the delegations, the 
advice stated ‘I confirm that the delegations that were put in place after the machinery 
of government changes are valid and that [the Executive Director] and Major Projects 
Victoria are able to operate under these delegations’. DBI was unable to provide us 
with the questions it asked that resulted in the advice. 
Under the Standing Directions, the Minister for Finance may exempt persons, or a 
class of persons from the provisions within the Standing Direction. These exemptions 
may be unconditional or conditional. It is not evident that either MPV or DBI has sought 
such an exemption. 
Our legal advice on the issue has been equivocal. There is a view that the 
authorisation power within the delegations is inconsistent with the Standing Directions. 
The effect of this interpretation is that the Standing Directions would prevail. The 
alternative view is that the Standing Directions do not apply to the delegations. This 
would provide the contractors with the ability to authorise payments but appears at 
odds with the Minister for Finance’s policy intent, as expressed in the Standing 
Directions.  
If the advice is that the Standing Directions is correct, it raises several issues. First, it 
has the potential to significantly diminish the effectiveness of the Standing Directions, 
making them essentially inoperable if they conflict with primary legislation or 
instruments created under primary legislation. Second, this could create the ability to 
use delegations to avoid obligations.  
DTF needs to clarify these issues as a matter of priority. 
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2.5.2 Managing public records 
The Public Records Act 1973 requires public sector entities to keep full and accurate 
records. Responsibility for this rests with the head of the entity. For MPV, this is DBI’s 
Secretary. 
MPV has recognised deficiencies in its records management systems. In 2010, it 
committed to establish a records taskforce which was responsible for consolidating 
project information, improving knowledge management, and improving retention of 
information.  
The taskforce’s specific focus was on the storage of contracts and agreements, with its 
key output being the development of guidelines for giving documents an appropriate 
title, and managing folders and documents within the records management system. 
MPV did not undertake an assessment of whether all contracts and agreements were 
accounted for. Nor has it assessed whether records are being managed in accordance 
with the guidelines. It is evident from this audit’s findings around contract management 
that there are significant deficiencies with the way MPV manages key public records.  
The following Parts of this report discuss other records management issues including 
MPV’s inability to provide key project information such as project planning documents, 
construction contracts, project data, and consultant reports and data that it had paid 
for. 
Recommendations 
Major Projects Victoria should: 
1. obtain legal advice as to the employment status of its contractors and the 
provision of financial authorisations to them 
2. review the skills and capabilities required to carry out its functions and, if 
necessary, obtain advice from the Department of Premier and Cabinet about the 
ability for it to create additional public sector executive officer positions within 
Major Projects Victoria 
3. review its contract management practices and implement practices that are 
consistent, at a minimum, with the processes and policies that the Victorian 
Government Purchasing Board has established 
4. establish and implement a performance management framework for internal 
contractors so that payments and variations are linked to acceptable performance 
5. undertake an independent fraud risk assessment, particularly around contract 
management and payment systems, given the weaknesses in controls 
6. review its recruitment practices involving ex-employees so that, as a minimum, 
perceived and potential conflicts of interest are managed, and value-for-money 
obtained  
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Recommendations – continued 
7. establish a conflict of interest register and processes, in line with the Department 
of Business and Innovation’s conflict of interest policy, to enable it to identify and 
manage perceived, potential and actual conflicts of interest 
8. review its records management processes and practices against the 
requirements of the Public Records Act 1973 and associated standards and 
policies, and implement changes as appropriate  
9. review the completeness of its key records, including contracts and project 
documentation 
10. review its business planning to provide better clarity around its role, the actions it 
will implement to fulfil its role and the processes it will use to assess achievement 
of its role 
11. The Department of Treasury and Finance should clarify the purpose of Standing 
Direction 2.4(i) and whether it applies in all situations, and take appropriate action 
to give the requirement the necessary legislative force. 
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3  Project management and performance 
At a glance 
Background  
Effective infrastructure project management requires a framework that enables a 
consistent approach that maximises the likelihood of projects being delivered on time, 
to cost and to the intended scope. It also requires robust oversight frameworks and 
reliable management information on projects.  
Conclusion 
Major Projects Victoria (MPV) has a sound framework to guide the management of its 
projects, although there remain some gaps. However, it does not routinely apply the 
framework or better practice in operation. Ineffective oversight and quality assurance 
processes mean that MPV cannot demonstrate that it has a sound understanding of 
how it is performing across all of its projects and has not established processes to 
routinely learn from them.  
Findings  
• MPV does not have effective project oversight mechanisms in place that enable it 
to quality assure project management practices and learn from projects. It also 
cannot demonstrate that it has a sound understanding of the status of its projects.  
• On average, the main construction contract for projects are over the expected 
cost by around 18 per cent and over the planned end date by around 37 per cent. 
This differs significantly from MPV’s reported 100 per cent performance in 
delivering projects against ‘agreed plans’. 
• MPV's project data is unreliable. 
Recommendations 
Major Projects Victoria should: 
• strengthen financial management system controls so that original budgets cannot 
be altered, and so there is a clear audit trail of changes 
• review and address data quality and reliability issues, including assessing how it 
defines key data, and how it collects, collates and manages the data. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Major Projects Victoria’s (MPV) main role is to manage the delivery of infrastructure 
projects, typically on behalf of other public sector entities. Effective infrastructure 
project management requires a framework that enables a consistent approach that 
maximises the likelihood of projects being delivered on time, to cost and to the 
expected scope. 
Effective project management also requires robust oversight frameworks and reliable 
management information on projects. These support project planning and 
management activities to meet required standards, and enable management to take 
action where standards are not being met. 
3.2 Conclusion 
MPV has a sound framework in place to guide the management of its projects, 
although there remain some gaps. However, ineffective oversight and quality 
assurance processes mean that the framework and better practice are not being 
routinely applied operationally. MPV also has not established processes to learn from 
all projects and, therefore, continually improve. 
MPV’s approach to project oversight means that it cannot demonstrate that it has a 
sound understanding of how it is performing across all its projects. Data indicates 
significant differences between actual and reported performance—the latter suggesting 
perfect performance—notwithstanding there are major deficiencies that render the data 
unreliable. 
3.3 Project management  
Effective project management requires appropriate knowledge, skills, tools and 
techniques to successfully deliver a project. MPV aims to be consistent across 
projects. This requires the tools and techniques to be documented and used in 
accordance with established processes. 
MPV has a sound framework in place to guide project management that adopts most 
of the better practice project management principles. However, MPV is not consistently 
applying the framework or better practice principles across its projects in operation.  
3.3.1 Project management framework 
MPV has a Project Management Framework (PMF) that it first issued in July 2008. The 
PMF provides guidance on MPV’s project management activities, processes and 
procedures for project phases that include initiation, development, procurement and 
delivery. The PMF also describes mandatory requirements and standard information to 
be included in plans, but allows some flexibility and customisation of plans from project 
to project.  
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Before 2008, MPV had no documented project management framework and it relied on 
the skills and experience of its staff and contractors to manage project delivery. There 
are significant risks in not having a documented framework, including the failure to 
adequately develop key project management documents. Adequate planning is likely 
to have a positive impact on the effectiveness of project management.  
MPV recognised these risks in deciding to develop the PMF to guide all MPV project 
management staff in their roles and responsibilities, and to enable a consistent 
approach in managing and delivering projects. 
Applying the framework and better practice 
To understand how effectively MPV implements its PMF and to assess its systems and 
processes against better practice, we assessed three projects: the Melbourne Recital 
Centre and Melbourne Theatre Company’s Theatre (MRC/MTC) development, the 
Princes Pier renewal and the State Sports Facilities Project.  
We assessed the three projects by reviewing project management plans (PMP) for 
each project against guidance in MPV’s PMF and against better practice guidance 
from the Project Management Body of Knowledge which outlines various inputs and 
outputs to the project planning process. Key outputs have been mapped against 
MPV’s PMF for project planning and there are many similarities, including: 
• project scope statement  
• procurement management plan 
• quality management plan 
• communication plan 
• work breakdown structure 
• schedules 
• control costs or project cost management 
• performance reporting 
• risk management plan. 
We also assessed key project information, such as approved budgets, signed main 
construction contracts, project reporting, financial reporting and the management of 
project variations.  
With the exception of elements of the Princes Pier and the MRC/MTC projects, we 
were satisfied that MPV had adhered to the PMF and project management better 
practice in delivering these projects. Our assessment included reviewing PMPs, project 
governance arrangements, monthly client and contractor reports on project status, the 
assessment and payment of contract progress claims, quality assessments of works, 
certificates and directions issued to contractors and the management, and approval of 
project variations.  
For Princes Pier, there were a range of deficiencies in the way that it planned the 
project, including a poorly developed PMP, and the lack of appropriate project 
governance.  
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For MRC/MTC, while its planning was generally sound, there were weaknesses 
around approvals and review of the plan. Issues related to these two projects are 
detailed in Figure 3A. 
  Figure 3A
Princes Pier renewal and MRC/MTC Theatre 
Princes Pier renewal 
This project involved the partial demolition and restoration of the Princes Pier in Port 
Melbourne. For this project, DBI was the client and project manager, as well as the end 
user. This is not the normal practice for most projects that MPV delivers, with an external 
client and end user more typical. 
While there is a project management plan for this project, it has many deficiencies that are 
likely to have contributed to poor project outcomes. The plan does not conform to MPV’s 
PMF or better practice. Issues include: 
• The plan consists of six individual files and document or version control is poor. It is 
unclear how the plan as a whole could be easily viewed and understood as separate 
files. 
• The plan was not approved and remained a draft document throughout the life of the 
project. 
• The plan lacks sufficient detail about objectives, governance and management, and 
time frames.  
• Significant gaps exist in the plan and key sections are missing. These include a project 
overview, work plan and work breakdown structure, schedules, project monitoring and 
performance measurement, procurement strategy, and risk management—although 
some risk registers do exist for the project. 
• The plan refers to Schedules that do not exist and refers to project governance 
arrangements that did not exist during the project. 
• The plan was not regularly or routinely updated during the project, despite significant 
changes to time frames and cost occurring during the life of the project. The plan was 
created in 2006 and updated once in 2010. 
MPV’s PMF states that a project management plan documents how a project will be 
managed so that it is delivered on time, within budget and meets performance criteria. The 
project did not have a complete, comprehensive and coherent plan, and the project was 
completed significantly over time and budget. It was originally scoped as a five stage 
project with initial funding of $14 million to complete stages one and two with additional 
funding of $6 million estimated to complete stages three, four and five. All five stages were 
intended to be completed by April 2008. The project was completed in December 2011 at a 
total cost of $32.5 million. The completed project consisted of the first three stages of the 
original plan and a ‘forest’ of piles at the seaward end of the pier. Delays and increased 
costs to complete the project were primarily due to the existing pier structure being in a 
worse condition than initially planned for.  
MPV did not establish a Project Control Group—the key governance and oversight body for 
projects—or equivalent for this project. Rather, the project director reported directly to the 
Executive Director, MPV. This is significant given that DBI was the client organisation and 
project manager for this project, and also owns the infrastructure. There is no rationale 
about why MPV did not adopt its generic governance model for this project. Consequently, 
DBI was essentially overseeing itself with little or no outside or independent oversight for 
delivery of the project. This approach lacks accountability and transparency.  
Melbourne Recital Centre and Melbourne Theatre Company Theatre  
This project was completed in 2008. It involved developing a Recital Hall (Melbourne 
Recital Centre) and Melbourne Theatre Company’s (MTC) new theatre facility. There were 
separate project control groups established for the two major components of the project—
the Recital Centre and MTC Theatre—as they have different stakeholder/end users (Recital 
Centre Interim Board and the University of Melbourne for the MTC Theatre). 
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Figure 3A  
Princes Pier renewal and MRC/MTC Theatre – continued 
MPV developed a PMP for this project, and it addresses most elements of MPV’s PMF and 
better practice. However, some sections were not developed and neither MPV's Executive 
Director, nor the project’s project control group approved the PMP. It remained unapproved 
throughout the life of the project.  
There were three iterations of the plan, all completed in May 2004. There were no further 
updates to the PMP during the project, which finished in 2008. Some sections are marked 
‘to be developed’ or ‘preliminary not finalised or agreed’. MPV is unable to explain why this 
is the case. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on Major Projects Victoria information. 
3.4 Project oversight 
Project oversight is fundamental to the effective, efficient and economical delivery of 
projects. It involves performing a quality assurance role around the actions that project 
directors and managers make during projects, continually learning from projects, and 
improving practices. It also requires having robust management information that 
enables an assessment of projects, and remedial action to be taken where 
performance is not meeting expectations. 
MPV does not have effective project oversight mechanisms in place, and cannot 
demonstrate that it has a sound understanding of the status of its projects. 
3.4.1 Quality assurance 
MPV’s PMF is one aspect of quality assurance in that it provides a framework that, if 
applied as intended, should result in quality project management. Better practice 
identifies the need for a role of Project Management Office to support project 
managers by: 
• managing shared resources across all projects administered by the Project 
Management Office 
• identifying and developing project management methodology, best practices and 
standards 
• coaching, mentoring, training and oversight 
• monitoring compliance with project management standards, policies, procedures, 
and templates via project audits 
• developing and managing project policies, procedures, templates, and other 
shared documentation  
• coordinating communication across projects. 
Within MPV, the Director of the Project Management Group is expected to perform 
these roles, as this role has oversight and responsibility for all infrastructure projects. 
This includes the delivery of projects by each project director, as well as the 
development and maintenance of the PMF. 
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However, two of three projects we examined contained fundamental shortcomings. 
While the director meets with project directors on a weekly basis to discuss projects, 
this is not a substitute for developing robust procedures to enable critical project 
documentation to be properly assessed, understood, approved and routinely reviewed.  
Maintaining the project management framework 
MPV requires that it updates its PMF quarterly to reflect the latest developments, 
amendments and changes in government policies and legislation that may affect the 
project management environment. It should also reflect changes in industry standards 
and trends.  
The PMF requires that there is a process in place to update the framework. The 
Director of the Project Management Group is responsible for overseeing the PMF’s 
review. 
Despite the PMF being in place for four years, there is no system or process to enable 
its update, nor does MPV have systems and processes to routinely capture and 
assess information from industry, and compare it against the PMF. Apart from some 
changes to the PMF to reflect legislative changes, MPV has not assessed the currency 
of the information in the PMF, nor has it updated it more generally. The PMF still 
contains incomplete sections, including elements relating to project procurement, 
project completion, and handover and corporate services. Four of the appendices also 
remain undeveloped.  
Continuous improvement 
Continuously improving practices is an element of effective governance. It enables 
entities to assess their performance, identify what worked and what did not and, as 
appropriate, change processes and systems to improve future performance. 
MPV recognises the importance of continuous improvement in its annual business 
plans, identifying ‘capturing the learnings from successes and failures’ as one of its key 
leadership behaviours. Despite this, it does not have any systems or processes to 
routinely capture information about projects to enable continuous improvement. Nor 
does it routinely or regularly assess projects for this purpose. 
While MPV conducted a ‘lessons learned’ exercise in 2009, this was at the request of 
the Minister for Major Projects, not because of any established practice. MPV advised 
of two other reviews that it has undertaken in relation to individual projects. These 
were a 2005 review of the Austin Health redevelopment and Mercy Hospital for 
Women relocation and a 2011 review of the Melbourne Park redevelopment project. 
The Melbourne Park review resulted in ‘project principles’, which have been applied to 
later stages of the project. MPV has no plans to establish any systems or ongoing 
processes that would enable it to continuously improve.  
Given the quality assurance weaknesses relating to the project documentation, the 
PMF and continuous improvement, MPV is not demonstrating that it represents 
value-for-money. 
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3.4.2 Management information 
From an organisational perspective, understanding the status of all projects is a key 
element of good corporate governance. Having this information readily available to 
MPV’s senior management and the Minister for Major Projects requires effective 
management information systems that produce relevant, current and reliable 
information. 
MPV has a range of reporting and meeting mechanisms in place to provide its 
management with information about the status of its projects. While these mechanisms 
appear extensive, particularly with regard to briefings, their focus is primarily on 
individual projects or broader organisational issues.  
MPV’s key reporting and meeting mechanisms include: 
• Fortnightly reports to the Deputy Secretary, Secretary and Minister for Major 
Projects. These reports are high-level, one-page summaries that describe issues 
around project time lines and progress, financial information, risks and issues, 
and future events and milestones. They are largely descriptive reports with few 
metrics. 
• Quarterly reports for the deputy secretary. These are a compilation of the most 
recent monthly project control group reports. Typically they are voluminous 
reports with some metrics. However, they require a degree of prior knowledge to 
understand them, and because of the level of detail they require careful reading 
to readily understand the status of the project. 
• Monthly risk reports to the executive director. These reports contain information 
about possible risks and contingencies for each project.  
• Weekly project director and group head meetings to discuss the status of each 
project. Outcomes of these meetings are undocumented. 
• Weekly group head meetings with the executive director. These meetings focus 
on MPV’s operations, with some focus on projects. 
• Weekly executive director meetings with the deputy secretary. These meetings 
focus on MPV’s operations and some projects, rather than overall project 
delivery. 
• Weekly executive director and deputy secretary meetings with the Minister for 
Major Projects’ office. These meetings focus on specific projects, and also 
significant operational issues, such as external audits of performance. 
There is no evident management information that provides collated information on all 
projects and other MPV activities to give management a sense of MPV’s overall 
performance. While MPV considers that it has sufficient information about the status of 
projects and overall performance from meetings and project reports, it cannot 
demonstrate this understanding, nor is it transparent. Information obtained through 
meetings about projects resides with individuals, and any assessment of overall 
performance is undocumented. This is a gap in MPV’s and DBI’s governance.  
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3.5 Project performance 
While MPV has some systems and processes in place to provide it with information 
about the status and performance of its projects, these do not provide it with adequate 
information about all of the capital projects it is managing. Information of this type is 
not typically available within MPV.  
In addition, MPV publicly reports that, in delivering projects it achieves 100 per cent 
performance in delivering against ‘agreed plans’. Part 4 of this report discusses MPV’s 
reported performance. Given the gaps in MPV’s management information, and 
because of its reported performance, we obtained data from MPV to enable us to 
understand the actual performance of its projects. 
It is important to note that MPV is not responsible for all changes to a project that may 
impact on costs and time. Factors such as client entities changing the project’s scope, 
and weather can affect the cost and timeliness of projects.  
MPV’s data shows a marked difference between actual and reported performance, with 
most projects exceeding cost and time measures. This is not the impression that DBI’s 
external performance reporting creates. There are major deficiencies with MPV’s data 
and data management practices that mean the underlying data are unreliable. This has 
implications for its public reporting and other reports that have relied on MPV data.  
While the unreliable data undermines the usefulness of the project data that this report 
presents, the value of including even unreliable data outweighs this given the absence 
of publicly available data.  
3.5.1 Project data 
MPV has previously sought to understand its project performance by undertaking 
benchmarking studies. However, this is the extent of its assessment of actual 
performance across all projects.  
For this audit, we sought similar data to that provided for the benchmarking studies. 
Primarily, this data related to the main contract for projects. There are usually other 
contracts and other costs associated with project delivery. However, the main 
construction contract typically forms the largest portion of a capital infrastructure 
project. Analysis of the main construction contract as one measure of MPV’s 
performance is consistent with the approach taken in the benchmarking studies, and 
therefore provides a good indicator of a project’s, and MPV’s, performance. We also 
obtained data on the whole project cost and time, which has all costs in addition to the 
main contract, and all time charged to a project. 
Benchmarking studies 
In 2009, MPV contracted an external provider to undertake a benchmarking study of its 
projects. MPV’s poor record management practices mean that it was unable to locate 
information relating to the commissioning of the studies, and hence the reason for 
MPV benchmarking its performance. 
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The statistical analysis was based on project completion time and project cost data 
based on the main contract for MPV projects from 1998 to 2008 inclusive. It compared 
MPV’s performance with that of the private sector and interstate government projects. 
We have assessed the benchmarking studies and consider they are methodologically 
sound. The analysis found that the MPV projects studied: 
• had gradually improved cost and time performance, although the magnitude of 
the average improvement is not specified in the document 
• performed better on cost than the private sector projects studied—68 per cent of 
MPV projects were within a 15 per cent budget contingency, compared with 
56 per cent for the private sector projects 
• had better on-time performance compared with private sector projects studied—
45 per cent of MPV projects were within a 15 per cent time contingency, 
compared with 35 per cent for the private-sector projects  
• performed less well than the interstate government projects—68 per cent of MPV 
projects were within a 15 per cent budget contingency, compared with 
79 per cent for the interstate government projects, and 45 per cent of MPV 
projects were within a 15 per cent time contingency, compared with 73 per cent 
for the interstate government projects. 
These results are supported by a subsequent benchmarking study completed by the 
same external provider for MPV in August 2010. The 2010 analysis used essentially 
the same methodology and reached a similar conclusion on the trend in project 
performance. However, it examined a broader range of Victorian Government projects, 
not just MPV projects.  
In 2011, DBI advised the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee that the 2010 
benchmarking study was completed to determine the value of efficiencies and 
effectiveness achieved from MPV planned and delivered projects. However, this 
benchmarking study focused on projects across the whole of the Victorian 
Government, and does not specifically benchmark MPV’s performance. MPV’s 
representation, therefore, is not accurate. It is unclear why MPV did not disclose to 
Parliament the existence of the first benchmarking study, which did focus specifically 
on MPV’s performance. 
We have identified, through MPV’s business plans, that a further benchmarking study 
was completed around 2006–07. This study appears to benchmark MPV with 
international projects, with MPV noting that it ‘…recently benchmarked its performance 
against international project performance benchmarks and our performance compares 
favourably with these international benchmarks. In fact, MPV’s performance is more 
than two times better than the international average’. However, MPV has been unable 
to locate this study within its information management systems. 
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Comparison of VAGO data to the benchmarking studies  
Using the available data for projects between 2000 and 2012, we performed similar 
analysis to the benchmarking studies to enable comparison. Our analysis focused on:  
• The average cost ratio, which is the actual main contract cost divided by the 
planned main contract cost for the project. A cost ratio of 1.00 means contracts 
are on budget, on average. In essence, the higher the ratios, the more over 
budget contracts are. 
• The average time ratio, which is the actual main contract completion time divided 
by the budgeted main contract time. A ratio of 1.00 means main contracts are on 
time, on average. The higher the ratios, the more over time main contracts are. 
Compared with the 2009 benchmarking study: 
• MPV is performing about the same on average contract cost but less well on 
average timeliness for their projects when compared to this study. MPV main 
contracts are coming in over budget on average with a cost ratio of 1.18 
compared to the benchmarking ratio of 1.15.  
• The budget performance of MPV projects is below that of interstate government 
projects and private sector projects as found in the benchmarking study. MPV is 
performing less well when it comes to timely delivery of projects. It has a time 
ratio of 1.41 compared to the benchmarking ratio of 1.32. The time performance 
of MPV main contracts is between that of interstate government projects and 
private sector projects as found in the benchmarking study.  
Differences in our results and the benchmarking results should be expected given we 
could not precisely replicate the benchmarking study’s method. In addition, the data 
that MPV provided for the benchmarking study differs significantly from the data it 
provided to us. We discuss data reliability and data management issues after 
Figure 3B. 
Main contract performance 
Figure 3B shows the performance of the main construction contract for projects that 
MPV has managed since 2000. MPV provided us with data on the cost and timeliness 
of recent major projects. Twenty-one of the projects in the dataset had complete data, 
which has been used in the analysis represented in Figure 3B.  
The data shows that on average, contracts are over the expected cost by around 
18 per cent and over the planned end dates by around 37 per cent. This differs 
significantly from MPV’s reported 100 per cent performance in delivering against 
‘agreed plans’, which creates an impression of perfect performance. 
We also analysed the data to determine the trend in performance, in terms of the cost 
and time to complete projects. Contracts that were signed more recently are less likely 
to run over time than contracts signed in the past. This is consistent with the findings in 
the benchmarking study. However, in terms of cost performance, contracts that were 
signed more recently are not performing better or worse on cost than contracts that 
were signed in the past. 
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3.5.2 Data reliability 
We experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining standard project information from 
MPV. This was not due to an unwillingness to provide the information, but rather an 
inability to readily provide it. MPV’s processes are predominantly manual, and much of 
the information we requested was sourced from hardcopy documents retrieved from 
archives. Manual processes increase the risk of unreliable data. 
Some of the information that MPV had difficulty in readily providing included: 
• the original approved budget and costs for project phases 
• main contract signing dates, main contract planned site possession and practical 
completion dates, actual site possession and practical completion dates 
• main contract planned cost and actual cost at completion  
• project management plans, signed memoranda of understanding, signed main 
contracts and contract programs. 
In addition to verifying a selection of source documents, we also sought the data that 
MPV provided for the benchmarking study in 2009. We expected much of the data to 
match given the similar nature of the projects and the time frames, and the nature of 
the source documents for both. This is particularly so for completed projects, because 
the data should not change after it is complete.  
MPV did not have copies of the benchmarking data, which it had developed only three 
years ago, in its record management systems. Instead, we obtained the data from the 
study’s author. 
There is a substantial difference between the projects and cost and time data that MPV 
provided to us for this audit, and that it provided for the benchmarking study. This 
includes different data for completed projects that were included in the benchmarking 
study and our data in Figure 3B. This means the data is unreliable, and raises 
significant questions about how MPV can provide different data for the same projects. 
MPV cannot explain the differences, and this highlights major deficiencies in its data 
management, record keeping and governance. 
Major Projects Victoria data provided to VAGO 
There are significant differences in the types of projects that MPV provided to us and 
to the benchmarking study, despite their similar focus. These differences include: 
• MPV provided us with data on 22 projects undertaken for the period 2000–12, 
and provided the benchmarking study with 29 projects for the period 2000–09.  
• There were eight projects that MPV provided to us that it did not provide for the 
benchmarking study. While four of these projects were completed after 2009, this 
does not account for the other four projects.  
• MPV provided the benchmarking study with 15 projects that it did not provide to 
us, and 14 projects that it provided to both us and the benchmarking study. 
The 14 projects covered in information provided by MPV to both VAGO and the 
benchmarking study are listed in Figure 3C. 
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  Figure 3C
Comparison of Major Projects Victoria data provided to different parties 
Project VAGO data 
Benchmarking 
data Difference 
Austin Hospital(a)  
Contract cost ($ million) $247.3 $227.6 $19.7 
Actual cost ($ million) $273.0 $251.2 $21.8 
Contract completion 13/01/06 31/12/06 11 months 
Actual completion 22/06/07 31/12/07 6 months 
Museum of Victoria  
Contract cost ($ million) $161.5 $176.2 $14.7 
Actual cost ($ million) $185.4 $186.2 $0.8 
Contract completion 01/02/99 21/12/99 10 months 
Actual completion 06/11/00 21/12/00 1 month 
Royal Park State Netball & Hockey Centre 
Contract cost ($ million) $22.6 $22.5 $0.1 
Actual cost ($ million) $26.1 $29.2 $3.1 
Contract completion 20/03/00 30/04/00 1 month 
Actual completion 24/01/01 30/11/00 2 months 
Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre Stage 2 
Contract cost ($ million) $51.6 $51.0 $0.6 
Actual cost ($ million) $61.2 $63.9 $2.7 
Contract completion 30/06/05 (b) n.a 
Actual completion (b) (b) n.a 
Nagargee Centre for Contemporary Art 
Contract cost ($ million) $10.2 (b) n.a 
Actual cost ($ million) $10.8 (b) n.a 
Contract completion 01/11/01 31/12/01 2 months 
Actual completion (c)31/01/03 31/12/01 25 months 
Parliament House Catering Facilities 
Contract cost ($ million) $4.9 $3.9 $1.0 
Actual cost ($ million) $4.9 $3.9 $1.0 
Contract completion (c)30/06/06 28/02/08 26 months 
Actual completion (c)30/06/06 03/05/08 23 months 
Hepburn Springs Bathhouse  
Contract cost ($ million) $8.5 $9.3 $0.8 
Actual cost ($ million) $8.7 $9.6 $0.9 
Contract completion (c)30/11/07 30/11/08 12 months 
Actual completion 30/05/08 03/05/08 1 month 
MRC/MTC Theatre  
Contract cost ($ million) $99.2 $99.2 $0.0 
Actual cost ($ million) $115.1 $113.9 $1.2 
Contract completion 23/10/08 05/12/08 2 months 
Actual completion 12/09/08 30/09/08 0 months 
Sidney Myer Music Bowl  
Contract cost ($ million) $13.6 $14.2 $0.6 
Actual cost ($ million) $18.2 $18.4 $0.2 
Contract completion 01/11/00 (b) n.a 
Actual completion 30/11/01 (b) n.a 
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Figure 3C 
Comparison of Major Projects Victoria data provided to different parties – 
continued 
Project VAGO data 
Benchmarking 
data Difference 
Multi-Purpose Arena  
Contract cost ($ million) $53.7 $56.1 $2.4 
Actual cost ($ million) $62.1 $61.2 $0.9 
Contract completion (c)31/12/99 (b) n.a 
Actual completion (c)31/07/00 (b) n.a 
Australian Synchrotron(c)  
Contract cost ($ million) $43.3 $206.3 $163.0 
Actual cost ($ million) $56.9 $221.0 $164.1 
Contract completion 15/05/05 31/08/07 27 months 
Actual completion 03/03/05 31/03/07 25 months 
William Barak Bridge  
Contract cost ($ million) $24.3 $30.8 $6.5 
Actual cost ($ million) $25.9 $32.8 $6.9 
Contract completion 15/08/05 31/12/05 4 months 
Actual completion 15/03/06 31/12/05 3 months 
Melbourne Rectangular Stadium 
Contract cost ($ million) $216.2 (b) n.a 
Actual cost ($ million) $237.4 (b) n.a 
Contract completion 22/12/09 31/12/09 0 months 
Actual completion 30/04/10 (b) n.a 
Bonegilla Migrant Settlement  
Contract cost ($ million) $1.0 (b) n.a 
Actual cost ($ million) $1.1 (b) n.a 
Contract completion (c)30/11/04 31/03/03 20 months 
Actual completion (c)28/02/05 01/09/03 18 months 
(a) Austin Hospital project – Information provided by Major Projects Victoria to VAGO refers to the 
‘new towers’. The Benchmarking data refers to the ‘Mercy Towers’. These are considered to be 
the same project. 
(b) Major Projects Victoria could not provide this data. 
(c) Month only dates have been provided. We have assumed the last day of the month. 
(d)  Synchrotron project – two projects are listed in the projects provided by Major Projects 
Victoria to the Benchmarking Study (Australian Synchrotron and National Synchrotron). The 
Benchmarking Study author advised that there was a main contract and then supplementary 
contracts for the same facility. The main contract has been used for the Benchmarking Study 
data shown.  
Note: Where a project consists of more than one portion or sub-project and each has different 
practical completion dates, the latest planned date and latest completion date has been used.  
Final data used by the Benchmarking Study has been used for analysis. This data was finalised 
after numerous updates by Major Projects Victoria and cross checks by Benchmarking Study 
researchers. The Benchmarking Study used all data they could gain and confirm from Major 
Projects Victoria. No data was excluded from the study if it was available. 
The Benchmarking Study used only projects where data was complete for either time or cost – 
some projects had complete data while some had only complete cost or time data. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from data provided by Major Projects Victoria and the 
Benchmarking Study author. 
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As shown in Figure 3C, there are significant differences in both the cost and time data. 
In no case does the data match. For example, the cost difference between the 
information MPV provided the benchmarking study and to VAGO for one project is 
around $160 million, while for others the cost differences range from hundreds of 
thousands to millions. Similarly, for time the differences in the data, where completion 
dates are known, range from one month up to two years. This data should be identical, 
particularly as it was provided to the benchmarking study and VAGO only three years 
apart—in 2009 and 2012. 
3.5.3 Data management 
A key aspect of MPV’s data management is the management of project budget data. 
Project budgets inform whether MPV has successfully managed the project from a cost 
perspective. The project budget is essentially the baseline for project cost data. 
MPV does not manage its project budget effectively. This is because it has a poor and 
inconsistent view of what an ‘original approved budget’ is.  
Given MPV spends other entities’ funds while it manages their projects, it needs to 
know how much it can spend. The Project Control Group (PCG) also needs to know 
what the project budget is so that it can monitor expenditure against it. Therefore, it is 
logical that the approved budget is that which the PCG agrees to. This is consistent 
with the approach taken in the benchmarking study. 
While MPV’s Insynergy system identifies the need for an original approved budget, 
MPV does not define what an original approved budget is. It is therefore not possible to 
reliably determine what the baseline is for each project, or how MPV determined it. 
This approach diminishes the ability to audit MPV’s budget data and provides little 
confidence about its reliability. This is a major weakness in MPV’s data management. 
Regardless, the way that MPV manages the data that it does consider being the 
approved budget highlights further weaknesses. These relate to how its data 
management practices can affect project performance data, and also the integrity of its 
systems. 
Project budget information 
According to the Insynergy user guide, once a project’s original approved budget is 
entered into Insynergy it should not be changed. Any revisions to a project’s budget, 
such as the provision of additional funding, should be shown as a revision/transfer. The 
sum of the approved budget and any revisions/transfers then provides the current 
budget for a project. This provides a transparent approach to project budget changes. 
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Original approved budget figures that MPV provided were frequently not what they 
were purported to be. Rather, they were the current approved budget, inclusive of 
revisions. For some projects it was clear MPV was providing a current approved 
budget, while for other projects it was not apparent. Often the only way to identify this 
was through a detailed assessment of original project documentation. This is not an 
efficient way to obtain this information, and raises questions—to which MPV had no 
answers—about why original approved budgets were changed, despite its own 
controls prohibiting this. 
Insynergy only shows the most recent information. While an audit trail of changes 
made to budget and other data is maintained in the system, it is not evident for all 
projects that changes may have been made. Examples of issues around changes to 
the original budget are included in Figure 3D. 
  Figure 3D
Discrepancies with original approved budgets 
Princes Pier 
Funding of $14 million was provided to complete the first two project stages, while an 
estimated $6 million, was to be sought at a later date to complete the final three stages. The 
project therefore had an estimated total investment of around $20 million.  
The final cost for the project was $32.5 million. While the original approved budget was 
$14 million, MPV’s systems reflect the original budget as $34 million, which is the current 
budget.  
State Sports Facilities project 
In July 2008 the original project budget was $44.3 million and the project was scheduled for 
completion by June 2011. In April 2009 additional funding of $10 million was provided and a 
further $12.9 million in April 2011, bringing the approved revised budget to $67.2 million.  
MPV cost reports from July 2012 shows the approved budget as $46.3 million, rather than 
the original $44.3 million. MPV advised that this figure is the original budget, plus 
allowances for South Melbourne Football Club redevelopment, external signage, general 
expenses and furniture. MPV could not provide documentation to adequately explain the 
discrepancy.  
MPV has also provided VAGO a figure of $67.2 million (April 2011) as the approved budget 
for this project as part of summary data for all capital projects. This figure is clearly not the 
original approved budget approved by the PCG which was $44.3 million and this does not 
accurately reflect the original approved budget for the project.  
MRC/MTC Theatre project 
There are some discrepancies with approved budget figures for this project. The most 
recent version of the project plan lists the budget as $94 million, while the Insynergy master 
report from July 2012 lists the approved budget as $121.5 million, with revisions of 
$6.5 million and a current budget of $128.03 million. MPV provided VAGO with an approved 
budget figure of $128.4 million during the audit which differs from both the Insynergy 
approved budget figure and the figure in the project plan provided by MPV. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
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This approach can misrepresent the performance of projects. By using a current 
budget as a baseline for project costs, actual expenditure generally matches, or is very 
close to, this continually revised baseline. Comparing actual expenditure to the original 
approved budget would show the difference between current and intended costs—
albeit there may be legitimate reasons for revisions to the budget. It is a more 
transparent approach. 
Our analysis of main contract costs identified average cost overruns of around 
$9.7 million, representing 18.3 per cent of the project’s main contract cost which is only 
a portion of the whole cost of a project. Our analysis of whole-of-project cost 
performance using the original approved budget MPV provided suggests average cost 
underruns of –3.5 per cent. This indicates a 21.8 per cent difference between the main 
contract cost and the whole-of-project cost, however, we do not consider this data to 
be reliable. 
Recommendations 
Major Projects Victoria should: 
12. develop a process to routinely capture and assess industry and other information, 
and update its Project Management Framework as appropriate 
13. develop robust oversight processes so that the Project Management Framework 
is appropriately applied and key stages approved and reviewed, and there is 
compliance with required project standards, policies and procedures 
14. establish a project review mechanism so that lessons from each project are 
identified, assessed, incorporated into practices as appropriate, and 
communicated 
15. define and document governance arrangements for projects without external 
clients or end users so that there is an appropriate level of accountability, 
direction and oversight of project implementation 
16. develop management information that provides a reliable, documented overview 
of project performance across all projects 
17. define what an original approved budget is and consistently apply it to all projects 
18. strengthen financial management system controls so that original budgets cannot 
be altered, and so there is a clear audit trail of changes 
19. review and address data quality and reliability issues, including assessing how it 
defines key data, and how it collects, collates and manages the data. 
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4  Reporting performance 
At a glance 
Background  
Monitoring and reporting performance is a key element of effective governance and 
public accountability. Public sector agencies have a responsibility to monitor and to 
report how they use public funds efficiently and economically to achieve intended 
outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Major Projects Victoria’s (MPV) systems and processes for monitoring performance 
are deficient and it cannot demonstrate at an organisational level whether it is 
effective, efficient and economical. MPV has reported to Parliament that it has 
achieved 100 per cent performance over a 14-year period, despite a lack of supporting 
data demonstrating its performance. 
Findings  
MPV and the Department of Business and Innovation have developed performance 
indicators as part of their external and internal accountability requirements, however, 
significant shortcomings exist:  
• The indicators are neither relevant nor appropriate, and are incapable of fairly 
representing actual performance. MPV does not properly assess its performance 
against its indicators. 
• The veracity of reported performance data and the information that the 
Department of Business and Innovation has provided to Parliament is not 
assured. 
Recommendations 
The Department of Business and Innovation should: 
• undertake a thorough and robust review of its external and internal indicators 
related to Major Projects Victoria assessment process 
• establish quality assurance mechanisms over Major Projects Victoria to provide it 
with appropriate assurance around Major Projects Victoria’s processes to assess 
performance. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Monitoring and reporting performance is a key element of effective governance and 
public sector accountability. Public sector entities have a responsibility to monitor and 
report whether they use public funds efficiently and economically to achieve intended 
outcomes and objectives. Effective performance monitoring and reporting should also 
enable an agency’s management to track performance and act to address 
underperformance when detected. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Major Projects Victoria (MPV) has deficient systems and processes in place to monitor 
performance and demonstrate at an organisational level whether it is effective, efficient 
and economical, and whether it provides Victoria’s tax payers with value-for-money.  
While it has performance indicators to assess its performance, MPV does not assess 
its performance against them, and it does not know how it is performing. The 
Department of Business and Innovation (DBI) has consistently reported to Parliament 
that it has achieved 100 per cent performance over a 14-year period, even though its 
performance cannot be reliably determined. This casts doubt on the veracity of 
information it has provided. These issues also highlight further fundamental failings in 
MPV’s and the DBI’s governance. 
4.3 Monitoring and reporting performance 
To effectively monitor performance, public sector entities need to have clearly 
articulated objectives, outcomes and outputs. They also need to have performance 
indicators that provide information on whether the entity is achieving what it said it 
would. 
To provide a reliable and accurate assessment of performance, an entity’s 
performance indicators need to be relevant and appropriate. A relevant indicator is one 
that has a logical and consistent relationship to the entity’s objectives, and that the 
entity is responsible for achieving. An appropriate indicator is one that is underpinned 
by sufficient information to assess its achievements against objectives, outcomes and 
outputs. This includes assessing trends over time and against predetermined 
benchmarks. 
MPV and DBI have developed performance indicators as part of their external and 
internal accountability requirements. Both seek to assess performance against 
departmental objectives, however, significant inadequacies exist. Both indicators differ 
and neither is related to MPV’s objectives. They are neither relevant nor appropriate, 
and are therefore incapable of fairly representing actual performance. Regardless, 
MPV does not properly assess its performance against its indicators.  
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4.3.1 External performance indicators 
The Victorian Government’s annual Budget Papers outline to Parliament and the public 
how it intends to collect and spend public money over the next four years. Budget 
Paper No. 3 Service Delivery provides information on the government’s service 
priorities, and on expected and actual performance in delivering these priorities. It 
includes each department’s key performance indicators. 
For the years 2011–12 and earlier, the key DBI performance indicators used by MPV to 
assess its performance have been: 
• Quality—delivery of nominated Major Projects Victoria projects complies with 
agreed plans, with a target of 100 per cent 
• Timeliness—typically one MPV project, with a financial year quarter completion 
date 
• Cost—represented by expenditure in $ millions. 
In the 2012–13 Budget Paper 3, MPV has reduced its performance indicators to only 
include a variation of the quality indicator ‘delivery of nominated Major Projects Victoria 
projects complies with agreed plans and contractual frameworks’. DBI has removed its 
timeliness indicator, and its cost indicator has been combined with other output groups.  
The following assessment is based on DBI’s performance indicators for MPV for the 
period 1998–99 to 2012–13. 
Quality indicator 
MPV’s quality indicator—the delivery of nominated Major Projects Victoria projects 
complies with agreed plans and contractual frameworks—is the main indicator it uses 
to assess and report externally on its overall performance. However, this indicator is 
neither relevant nor appropriate. It is not sufficiently related to DBI and MPV objectives 
and there is an inadequate understanding of what the indicator aims to measure. 
Relevance 
DBI’s Corporate Plan 2009–12 details three broad objectives relating to MPV, and 
16 supporting actions. The three objectives are: 
• provide project development and delivery services and expertise to other 
government agencies regarding complex property development and construction 
projects 
• lead project management and delivery 
• deliver major projects that achieve economic, social, and environmental 
outcomes for the Victorian community. 
MPV’s quality indicator is capable of assessing achievement of the first objective, as its 
supporting actions clearly identify that it relates to MPV’s core roles of providing project 
management services and advice regarding public private partnerships. However, the 
indicator is incapable of assessing achievement of the remaining two objectives. 
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While the second objective appears measureable with the indicator, the supporting 
actions do not support this. Achieving the first objective would only occur if MPV: 
• recruited and retained skilled project managers and infrastructure specialists 
• promoted best practice urban design principles, particularly ecologically 
sustainable design in projects 
• promoted MPV’s capability in thought leadership, infrastructure research and 
project management. 
None of these actions are sufficiently related to the delivery of nominated projects 
according to agreed plans—as the indicator details. This is also the case for the third 
objective, as the indicator cannot assess whether MPV has achieved economic, social 
and environmental outcomes. 
Appropriateness 
The fundamental weakness with this indicator is that MPV cannot reasonably explain 
the indicator’s key elements and what it is intending to measure. Consequently, it lacks 
a clear and consistent understanding of the indicator, which makes assessing 
performance a challenge. 
MPV could not adequately explain what an ‘agreed plan’ is or how it assessed 
performance against agreed plans. An agreed plan appears to be whatever plan there 
is between MPV and the client entity, including where MPV is also the client. 
This arrangement means that with each ‘agreement’, the performance baseline is reset 
and performance is assessed against that. This enables the baseline to be changed so 
that the performance standards can always be achieved. Unsurprisingly, MPV has 
achieved 100 per cent performance in every year that the indicator has been included 
in Budget Paper 3.  
However, an indicator such as this does not accurately reflect the actual performance 
of MPV in managing infrastructure projects. The data for the projects discussed in 
Part 3 of this report consistently shows project costs and time frames are exceeded. 
While there are often legitimate reasons for a project exceeding costs and time, the 
external reporting creates the impression that performance is significantly better than it 
is. This diminishes both transparency and accountability. The Public Accounts and 
Estimates Committee (PAEC) also identified this issue in its Report on the 2009–10 
and 2010–11 Financial and Performance Outcomes. 
There is also uncertainty about what projects are included in this indicator. In 2005–06 
and 2006–07, notes in Budget Paper 3 stated that ‘the projects referred to in this 
output are those for which funding is received directly by the department. The 
department also manages the delivery of major projects that are funded through other 
departments and agencies’. This statement was not repeated for other years and it is 
unclear why only those years were chosen to report on these projects, or whether the 
practice has continued.  
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The practice of reporting against MPV’s own projects was also supported by the 
government in 2011, in response to a PAEC recommendation where it stated that ‘MPV 
only reports on projects for which it receives direct funding’. The number of projects 
that MPV receives direct funding for is a small subset of its total projects, and reporting 
only against those projects does not accurately reflect MPV’s overall project delivery 
performance. It also does not enable adequate tracking of performance over time. 
When raised with MPV during this audit, it did not know about the note in 2005–06 and 
2006–07, and advised us that it did not think the government’s 2011 statement was 
correct. MPV should have a solid understanding of these issues and if it was 
appropriately assessing its performance each year these uncertainties would have 
been known and considered in collating the data. The lack of awareness raises further 
reservation around the veracity of the Budget Paper 3 data. 
Actual performance 
To accurately report to Parliament on its performance, DBI needs effective and efficient 
processes to collect, collate and analyse its performance data. It also needs reliable 
data on which to assess its performance. MPV’s ‘process’ to collect and collate and 
analyse performance data to inform Budget Paper 3 is deficient and unauditable.  
While DBI has reported to Parliament each year that MPV achieves 100 per cent 
performance in the delivery of its projects, MPV could not adequately demonstrate that 
it actually collects and collates data, nor could we identify sufficient and appropriate 
evidence that this occurs.  
This casts doubt about the veracity of the data reported in Budget Paper 3 and about 
the information that DBI has provided to Parliament, particularly through PAEC’s 
outcomes and estimates inquiries. It also raises the prospect that DBI has misinformed 
Parliament through its responses to PAEC questions about the MPV quality measure. 
As part of its response DBI: 
• implied that it had a process to determine when a project had not met 
performance standards—when it was material—which MPV does not have 
• indicated that it had an understanding of the elements of ‘agreed plan’—key 
milestones, completion dates and final costs—which MPV has not documented, 
and is inconsistent with our findings about the lack of a process related to this 
indicator. 
MPV does not have documented procedures that detail how it collects and collates 
performance data or what data it should collect. Its ‘process’ typically relies on one 
person to manually obtain the information. It involves asking project directors and 
managers—responsible for managing the delivery of MPV’s projects—to provide 
information on the status of their projects. According to MPV, for each of its projects 
this includes data on time, cost and quality. It is unclear what aspects of time, cost and 
quality MPV assesses.  
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MPV does not document the information provided, or any analysis. Without 
documenting this information, it is unclear how information from a range of projects is 
accurately collated and analysed to enable inputting onto a DBI spread sheet, which 
records quarterly performance information. This process is improbable, and despite 
MPV’s advice, this data collection is unlikely to occur. 
There are no mechanisms in place to provide assurance around data quality, with the 
information received by the collator in ‘good faith’. Manual data collection processes 
increase the risk of error in the collection and collation of this data. Even if MPV did 
collect, collate and analyse data, the absence of any quality control over it, combined 
with the data reliability issues discussed in Part 3 of this report, means the likelihood of 
it being reliable would be low. 
These shortcomings raise further reservation about the poor governance within MPV 
and at senior management levels within DBI. 
Timeliness indicator 
The timeliness indicator typically relates to only one project that MPV is managing, and 
assesses performance based on the achievement of a quarterly milestone. There is no 
apparent rationale for which project or milestone MPV selects. Fundamentally, this 
indicator does not provide an overall assessment of how timely MPV is for project 
management generally. 
The most significant deficiency with the timeliness indicator is that performance against 
this measure cannot be assessed. Each year MPV selects new projects, or new parts 
of existing projects, and considers them as new measures for reporting purposes. 
Because of this, MPV has never reported the actual performance against the planned 
performance of these projects. DBI removed this indicator for the 2012–13 reporting 
year. Combined with the inability to track performance over time, transparency and 
accountability is further diminished.  
Costs indicator 
DBI reports on MPV’s direct and indirect costs as part of its Budget Paper 3 reporting. 
There are a range of issues with its cost reporting that diminish transparency and 
accountability. This is particularly so for the most recent years. Importantly, MPV 
advised that the costs indicator includes its operational costs, including depreciation, 
fit out and assets, as well as costs associated with the sale of land as part of the Kew 
Redevelopment.  
While the sale of land may be a legitimate reportable cost for the purpose of Budget 
Paper 3, it is not possible to differentiate this from MPV’s operational costs. This 
prevents Parliament or the public from tracking MPV’s operational costs over time, or 
assessing MPV’s efficiency and economy. 
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MPV also advised that since at least 2010–11, its cost indicator includes costs 
associated with Invest Assist (a separate division of DBI), which has no apparent 
relationship to the delivery of major projects. DBI determines the costs target and the 
attribution to Invest Assist. This inclusion in MPV’s costs has not been publicly 
disclosed. 
There is also a lack of transparency about how DBI has reported this indicator over 
time, particularly in terms of actual expenditure and reasons for variances. In all but 
one year between 2000–01 and 2009–10, no explanations were provided for variations 
between target and actual cost, even though differences ranged from $2.4 million to 
$68 million across these years. In four years, actual costs were not reported, 
preventing assessment of their performance. 
In terms of transparency and accountability, for the 2012–13 Budget Paper 3, DBI 
combined MPV’s costs with Investment Attraction and Facilitation. This prevents any 
assessment of MPV’s performance in relation to target costs, and prevents reporting of 
actual costs for both 2010–11 and 2011–12.  
4.3.2 Internal performance measures 
Departmental heads are responsible for the general conduct, and the effective, efficient 
and economical management of their department. Understanding whether the 
department or its business units are operating to these standards requires a sound 
performance monitoring framework. 
The key mechanisms that MPV has established to monitor its performance internally 
are through its annual business plans. These plans contain performance indicators 
intended to provide information on MPV’s performance. DBI, through its corporate 
plan, also aims to assess MPV’s performance.  
MPV’s business plan includes three performance indicators to assess its performance 
as a business unit. Two indicators are the same as those included in Budget Paper 3—
quality and timeliness—and are not internal measures. This means that MPV has one 
internal measure—‘Achieve delivery of 80 per cent of infrastructure projects within  
+/– 10 per cent of agreed time, cost and scope (five-year average)’.  
DBI’s corporate plan indicator is the same as MPV’s indicator, with the exception that it 
does not include the ‘five-year average’ element—Achieve delivery of 80 per cent of 
infrastructure projects within +/– 10 per cent of agreed time, cost and scope. 
The indicators are neither relevant nor appropriate, and are therefore unable to 
represent MPV’s actual performance. 
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Relevance 
MPV’s business plans do not have stated objectives. Rather, it uses DBI’s corporate 
plan objectives to guide its activities. As was the case for the external performance 
indicators, MPV’s and DBI’s internal indicator has a logical relationship to only one of 
the objectives—the provision of project development and delivery services and 
expertise. For the same reasons as previously outlined, neither indicator has a 
relationship to the other objectives. Consequently, the indicators cannot be considered 
relevant. 
Appropriateness  
There are a range of issues with the MPV and DBI indicators that make them 
inappropriate to assess MPV’s performance. Like the external measure, MPV could 
not explain the indicator’s key elements and what it was intending to measure. For 
example, while the indicator quantifies scope, with a target of 80 per cent of projects 
within +/– 10 per cent, MPV was unable to explain how it would quantify scope. This 
means that MPV cannot track the indicator over time—a key attribute of an appropriate 
indicator. It is similarly unclear what ‘time’, ‘cost’, and ‘agreed’ mean, and why the 
particular performance standards were selected. 
It is also uncertain what projects the indicator intends to measure. MPV manages a 
range of projects. These are primarily nominated projects, which is what the external 
indicator is intended to assess, however, MPV also manages other capital projects that 
have not been nominated. Including all infrastructure projects would provide a better 
understanding of how well MPV performs its project management role. 
While the business plan cites DBI’s corporate plan as the source of the indicator, the 
two indicators differ. The business plan includes a five-year average, yet MPV does not 
know the purpose of this average and why it was added. Given changes to the 
indicator over the past five years, it would not be possible to get a reliable assessment 
using the five-year average. 
A further issue with the indicator is that it has a performance standard of 80 per cent, 
and of that 80 per cent, within +/– 10 per cent. This indicator is very similar to the 
quality indicator in Budget Paper 3, which has a performance standard of 100 per cent. 
MPV’s internal indicator appears to accept a lower level of performance compared with 
the external measure. The reasons for this are unknown to MPV. 
Actual performance 
Despite the indicator having been in place for nearly 10 years, MPV does not monitor 
its performance against it, and therefore MPV does not know, at an organisational 
level, how it is performing. Neither MPV nor DBI collect, collate, analyse or report data 
for MPV’s internal indicators at the business unit or corporate level. 
Like its external measures, MPV has no processes in place to assess its performance 
even if it wanted to. This is a further fundamental failing of MPV’s and DBI’s 
governance. 
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4.4 Reviewing Major Projects Victoria’s 
performance indicators 
4.4.1 2009 Major Projects Victoria review 
MPV has been aware of weaknesses with its performance monitoring framework since 
2009, yet little action has occurred to address these weaknesses. In its 2009–10 
business plan, MPV developed a business improvement project, which had the aim of 
improving the consistency and delivery of its services. Specifically, the project intended 
to: 
• develop processes and methods to review all current MPV projects 
(by December 2009) 
• determine key performance indicators for MPV projects (by February 2010) 
• review functionality of processes, methods and key performance indicators 
(by April 2010). 
This project was not progressed and MPV has taken no action to review its 
performance indicators. Given the weaknesses identified, not just with MPV’s 
indicators but also the absence of processes to assess its performance, this is a 
significant failing. 
Despite regarding itself as having a leadership role in major projects across Victoria, 
MPV has limited knowledge of how other entities assess their performance. MPV 
recently reviewed the Victorian Budget Papers to determine how other departments 
report on their capital projects. This appears to have been undertaken in response to 
this audit. MPV has no knowledge of how other similar Australian or international 
entities assess their performance. 
4.4.2 2011 Department of Business and Innovation review 
In March 2011, DBI reviewed its performance indicators. The context for the review 
was the planned introduction of the Public Finance and Accountability Bill in 2010. The 
review focused on DBI as a whole, although it addressed, to a limited extent, MPV’s 
performance indicators. 
In relation to MPV, the review considered that only one indicator was required, and that 
it should relate to time and cost—the only measures that it considered MPV could be 
held accountable to. The review suggested the indicator ‘MPV projects delivered within 
(per cent) of agreed time, cost and scope’, as it met the criteria of attributable and 
specific; accountable and meaningful; measurable and robust; and available and 
manageable. This is the same as the existing indicator. 
  
Reporting performance 
 
52       Managing Major Projects Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
However, the review’s assessment of MPV’s performance indicators is deficient for the 
following reasons: 
• it recommends keeping the existing indicator without having critiqued it. There is 
no assessment of what time and cost to measure, and from when 
• it also does not assess how to measure scope—particularly relevant given MPV 
does not know how to quantify or assess scope, and the review considered this 
was not something for which MPV could be held accountable 
• the recommended indicator suggests ‘per cent’ of agreed time, cost and scope, 
yet does not specify what the percentage should be, or what is meant by 
‘agreed’. It is unclear whether it would be the same as the +/– 10 per cent.  
• there is also no discussion around the appropriateness of the 10 per cent target 
in the existing internal indicator 
• there is no assessment or discussion of the external indicator, and whether it is 
relevant or appropriate.  
It is unclear what action MPV has taken in response to the review’s findings related to 
MPV. 
Recommendations 
20. The Department of Business and Innovation should undertake a thorough and 
robust review of its external and internal indicators related to Major Projects 
Victoria with the aim of: 
• developing new Budget Paper 3 measures that better represent actual 
performance 
• developing new internal indicators that provide Major Projects Victoria and 
the Department of Business and Innovation with a robust and reliable 
assessment of Major Projects Victoria’s performance 
• developing, documenting and using robust systems and processes to 
assess performance using Major Projects Victoria’s external and internal 
indicators 
• re-allocating responsibility for assessing performance, given failings with the 
current functions and responsibilities 
• establishing quality assurance mechanisms to oversee the performance 
assessment process to provide assurance about the process. 
21. The Department of Business and Innovation should, in light of the weaknesses 
identified with its internal and external performance indicators, review the major 
projects indicator in its Corporate Plan 2009–12. 
22. The Department of Business and Innovation should establish quality assurance 
mechanisms over Major Projects Victoria to provide it with appropriate assurance 
around Major Projects Victoria’s processes to assess performance. 
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Appendix A. 
 Major Projects Victoria governance protocol 
In 2006, the Premier endorsed a Major Projects Governance Protocol which provides 
two options for delivering major projects, and which highlights when MPV should be 
considered as an appropriate delivery agency during the planning for major project:  
• Option 1: Client department engages MPV for advice as required—where the 
Minister for Major Projects has no delivery accountability. 
• Option 2: MPV delivers a project on behalf of a client department—where 
the Minister for Major Projects is nominated as the minister responsible for 
delivering a project (or nominated components) under the Project Development 
and Construction Management Act 1994. Under this option, the responsible 
minister is sufficiently empowered to direct the facilitating agency and therefore 
MPV. 
The Major Projects Governance Protocol (below) explains how governance 
arrangements are addressed. The protocol also includes a template for allocating 
project responsibilities between MPV and a client. 
The updated Protocol below clarifies MPV’s client/deliverer relationships and includes 
a revised project manager/client responsibility split. 
Because MPV’s projects can be generated by both internal and external stakeholders, 
each also has the potential to act as an important service driver. While the Premier’s 
protocol determines how projects are delivered by MPV, and by a number of other key 
areas across government, there are inherent imbalances in some of the project 
delivery relationships. We will continue to apply the protocol as a risk mitigation 
initiative and monitor its progress.  
The Major Projects Governance Protocol has three steps. 
Step 1 – Which projects should be considered for MPV delivery? 
MPV may be the appropriate agency for delivering a project if: 
• it has a TEI (total estimated investment) of $100 million or greater 
• it is delivered as a public private partnership 
• it has a Gateway project profile model greater than 35 
• the Premier has requested it. 
If a project does not meet any of these criteria MPV does not need to be considered for 
delivery. 
The project profile model (PPM) is the first step in the Gateway process.  
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A PPM total score in the range 21–40 indicates that a program/project is medium risk. 
For medium risk projects, the Gateway Unit within the Department of Treasury and 
Finance appoints an independent team leader to oversee an independent 
department/agency review team. A department or agency nominates this team from 
resources outside a project team. 
Step 2 – Determining who is responsible for delivering a project 
The principle behind determining delivery responsibility for major projects is that major 
projects should be delivered by the agency that is best able to do so. 
When deciding if a client agency or MPV will deliver a project, the client minister and 
the Minister for Major Projects consider: 
• its size (such as its TEI) 
• the delivery mechanism (for example, via a public private partnership, an alliance, 
or a design and construct) 
• its risk profile 
• its complexity (including stakeholders and innovation) 
• a client agency’s capacity (due to existing workload), experience and current 
expertise in similar projects and delivery mechanisms 
• MPV’s experience and current expertise in similar projects and delivery. 
All criteria are to be considered as part of the overall decision regarding the most 
appropriate arrangements  
In general, MPV would be expected to deliver projects that are larger, more complex, 
or where the client agency lacks expertise or experience. 
Once these factors are considered, a client minister writes to the Premier and 
Treasurer advising that either: 
• they and the Minister for Major Projects agree that either the client department or 
MPV will deliver a project and explain why 
or 
• they and the Minister for Major Projects cannot agree and request the Premier 
and Treasurer to decide responsibility for a project. 
While it is expected that the criteria should provide clear guidelines in most cases, and 
the Premier and Treasurer’s involvement will not be required, it is acknowledged that 
responsibility may sometimes be unclear. 
Delivery responsibility should be resolved before the Business Expenditure Review 
Committee (BERC) considers project funding. The business case should detail and 
explain delivery responsibility.  
  
Appendix A. Major Projects Victoria governance protocol 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report Managing Major Projects       55 
Step 3 – Allocating responsibilities between Major Projects 
Victoria and a client department 
When MPV is responsible for delivering a project, project responsibilities are allocated 
to MPV and the client agency according to Figure A1. 
There are also other processes in terms of allocating responsibilities: 
• The Minister for Major Projects and the client minister or relevant senior 
executives meet to discuss and allocate responsibilities based on Figure A1. 
Departures from the template are permitted but must be documented and 
explained. 
• Formal project governance arrangements are confirmed at this meeting, such as 
the chair and membership of a project steering committee.  
• The timing of MPV’s involvement in a project should accord with table 1.1 below 
or with other agreed arrangements. 
• Budget arrangements must be documented before participating in the Business 
Expenditure Review Committee process.  
• A letter detailing agreed governance arrangements for a project that includes 
relevant information such as budget arrangements is delivered to the Premier 
and Treasurer. This information can be used for Project Development and 
Construction Management Act 1994 declaration and appointment purposes. 
  Figure A1
Allocating responsibilities between Major Projects Victoria  
and a client department 
Project stage Task Department  MPV 
Project feasibility Basic project scope & 
parameters 
Responsible Advice 
Initial ‘seed’ funding Basic outputs, functionality, 
performance 
Responsible  
 Policy fit and delivery outcomes Responsible   
 Inter-departmental liaison Responsible   
 Central agency liaison Responsible   
 Initial business case  Responsible   
 Preliminary project costings and 
time frame 
Responsible Advice 
BERC developmental 
funding 
Management of project 
development budget 
Responsible  
GATE 1 Strategic assessment  
Project business case Engagement of project business 
case design team 
Responsible Involved 
Development/ 
schematic design 
Management of process of 
business case design   
Responsible Involved 
 Further development of 
business case and project 
outputs, functionality, 
performance  
Responsible Involved 
 Finalise overall design concept Responsible Involved 
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Figure A1 
Allocating responsibilities between MPV and a client department – continued 
Project stage Task Department  MPV 
GATE 1 Strategic assessment – continued 
 Develop operational model Responsible   
 Stakeholder/related party 
engagement 
Responsible   
 Capital works commercial and 
procurement analysis 
Responsible Endorse 
 Capital works project budget 
estimates 
Responsible Endorse 
 Fundamental project design 
parameters agreed 
Responsible Endorse 
  
  
Finalised project costing and 
time frame 
Responsible Endorse 
 Project governance Responsible Endorse 
GATE 2 Business case  
BERC project funding 
decision 
      
Project conceptual 
design 
Engagement of project design 
team 
Responsible Endorse 
 Management of process of 
conceptual design   
Responsible Involved 
 Further development of business 
case and project outputs, 
functionality, performance 
Responsible Involved 
 Finalise overall design concept Responsible Involved 
 Develop operational model Responsible   
 Stakeholder/related party 
engagement 
Responsible   
 Capital works overall commercial 
and procurement analysis 
Responsible Endorse 
 Detailed commercial/procurement 
analysis once overall direction 
decided; for example Partnerships 
Victoria vs traditional delivery 
Endorse Responsible 
 Management of capital works 
budget and finances 
Involved Responsible 
 Fundamental project design 
parameters agreed 
Responsible Endorse 
 Finalised project costing and time 
frame 
Responsible Endorse 
 Project governance Responsible Endorse 
Project development 
design 
Ongoing but increasingly detailed 
development of design content 
Responsible Endorse 
 Stakeholder/related party 
management 
Responsible   
 Ongoing management of design 
process 
Involved Responsible 
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Figure A1 
Allocating responsibilities between MPV and a client department – continued 
Project stage Task Department  MPV 
GATE 2 Business case – continued  
 Finalisation of procurement and 
contracting approach 
Endorse Responsible 
 Provide alternatives for dealing 
with scope budget tension 
Involved Responsible 
 Provide guidance on feasibility of 
scope vs budget solutions 
Responsible Involved 
 Confirmation on capital works 
costings and time frame 
Involved Responsible 
  
  
Management of capital works 
budget and finances 
Involved Responsible 
 Project governance Responsible Endorse 
GATE 3 Procurement strategy  
Procurement Management of procurement 
process 
Involved Responsible 
 Assessment and identification of 
preferred bidder 
Involved Responsible 
 Nomination of preferred bidder Endorse Responsible 
 Selection of preferred bidder Responsible Endorse 
GATE 4 Tender decision  
Construction Management of construction 
issues 
  Responsible 
 Management of capital works 
cost and time frame 
Involved Responsible 
 Management of capital works 
budget and finances 
Involved Responsible 
 Decisions regarding scope 
change/reduction/deletion where 
required for financial reasons 
Responsible Endorse 
 Decisions regarding scope 
change/reduction/deletion where 
required for operational reasons 
Responsible Endorse 
 Preparation for handover to 
operations 
Responsible Involved 
 Project governance Responsible Endorse 
GATE 5 Readiness for service  
Operations 
  
Transition from construction to 
operations 
Responsible Involved 
 Construction defects rectification Involved Responsible 
 Construction warranty 
obligations 
Involved Responsible 
GATE 6  
Intentionally blank.    
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from Major Projects Victoria 
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Appendix B. 
 Major Projects Victoria projects 2000 to 2012 
Figure B1 
Projects by type and status 
Project name Project type Status 
Austin Health redevelopment and Mercy 
Hospital for Women relocation (new towers) 
Capital Completed 
Australian Synchrotron Capital Completed 
Avalon Fuel Line Feasibility Current 
Aviation Training College Feasibility Current 
Balaclava Business case Feasibility Completed 
Ballarat Transit Cities Feasibility Completed 
Bastion Point Advice only Completed 
Bayside (Beacon Cove) Property Completed 
Bio Tech Centre Feasibility Feasibility Completed 
Biosciences Research Centre Capital Current 
Bonegilla Migrant Experience Heritage Park Capital Completed 
Brimbank Civic Centre Project Feasibility Completed 
Brooklyn/Tottenham Precinct Re-use Advice only Completed 
Bundoora – Larundel Psych Hospital 
Redevelopment 
Property Completed 
VBRRA – Bushfire Reconstruction Advice only Completed 
Commonwealth Games Athletes Village Property Completed 
Corio Norlane Urban Renewal Advice/feasibility Completed 
Docklands Film & TV – Upgrade Oversight role Current 
Docklands Film and Television Studio Oversight role Completed 
Docklands Gas Remediation Decontamination  Completed 
Double Fault – Development over rail concept Feasibility Completed 
E-Gate Feasibility Current 
Exhibition Building Refurb Capital Completed 
Federation Arch Capital Completed 
Federation Square East Feasibility Completed 
Flinders St Station – Business Case Feasibility Completed 
Flinders Street Station Design Competition  Feasibility Current 
Florey Neuroscience Institute Advice Completed 
FOLD Facilities Project (MFB) Capital Current 
Former Fish Market Site redevelopment Property Completed 
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Figure B1 
Projects by type and status – continued 
Project name Project type Status 
Former Melbourne Convention Centre Advice only Completed 
Geelong Cultural Precinct – Bus Case Feasibility Completed 
Geelong Station Precinct Feasibility Completed 
Gippsland Infrastructure Study Feasibility Completed 
Government House Refurbishment Feasibility Completed 
Hazardous Waste Strategy Feasibility/ 
environmental approvals 
Completed 
Hepburn Springs Bathhouse Capital Completed 
Jolimont Station Improvement Feasibility Completed 
Jolimont/Eastside Capital Completed 
Kew Residential Services  Property Current 
Land development adjacent to rail Feasibility Completed 
Lynch's Bridge – Abattoirs Property Completed 
Lynch's Bridge – Saleyards Property Completed 
MCG Redevelopment Oversight role Completed 
MCG/Melbourne Park Footbridge Maintenance Completed 
Media House Advice only Completed 
Melbourne Convention Centre Development Capital Completed 
Melbourne Exhibition Centre Stage 2 Feasibility Potential PPP 
Melbourne Markets Relocation Capital Current 
Melbourne Park Redevelopment – Stage 1 Capital Current 
Melbourne Recital Centre and MTC Theatre Capital Completed 
Melbourne Rectangular Stadium  (AAMI Park) Capital Completed 
Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre Capital Completed 
Metropolitan Intermodal System Feasibility Completed 
MOPT Car Park Funding Feasibility Completed 
Mount Buffalo Chalet Advice only Completed 
Mount Martha Quarry Site Advice only Completed 
Museum of Victoria – Carlton Capital Completed 
National Gallery of Victoria Capital Completed 
Ngargee Australian Centre  
for Contemporary Arts 
Capital Completed 
Spencer Street Rail Project – oversight Advice/oversight Completed 
Parkville Gardens Residential Development Property Current 
Parliament House catering upgrade Capital Completed 
Point Grey/Slaughterhouse Site Advice only Completed 
Port Geelong Autos Feasibility Feasibility Completed 
Port of Hastings Feasibility/establish 
authority 
Current 
PPP – Water Conservation Internal feasibility Completed 
PPP – Social Housing Project Feasibility Completed 
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Figure B1 
Projects by type and status – continued 
Project name Project type Status 
Princes Pier Capital Completed 
RCH Assessment Advice Completed 
Regent Theatre/City Square Oversight role Completed 
Regional Office Accommodation Feasibility Completed 
Royal Melbourne Showgrounds Capital Completed 
Royal Park Sports Facility Capital Completed 
Seal Rock Phillip Island Study Advice only Completed 
Shrine Redevelopment Capital Current 
Sidney Myer Music Bowl Refurbishment Capital Completed 
Southbank Cultural Precinct Redevelopment Capital Current 
Sports Infrastructure Upgrade Capital Completed 
State Library (stages 4–6 works) Capital Completed 
State Shooting Facility Feasibility Completed 
State Sports Facilities Project Capital Completed 
Student Housing – PPP Feasibility Completed 
Sustainability Guidelines Internal Current 
TAFE Chisholm/Franks PV Lite Internal Completed 
Trainshed Way Development  Advice only Current 
Transit Cities Feasibility/advice only Completed 
Velodrome Capital Completed 
Vic Comprehensive Cancer Centre Advice to evaluation Completed 
Vic Urban Oversighting Admin role Completed 
Victorian Arts Master Plan Feasibility Completed 
Victorian Freight Strategy Advice only Current 
VicTrack Affordable Housing Feasibility/advice Completed 
Wehi Redevelopment Advice only Completed 
Western Intermodal Freight Terminal Feasibility Completed 
Westgate Memorial Capital Completed 
William Barak Bridge  Capital Completed 
Yarra Precinct Lighting Works Maintenance Completed 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Major Projects Victoria. 
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Appendix C. 
 Major Projects Victoria contractor details 
Figure C1 
Contractor details 
Contractor 1 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The original contract term was between May 2002 and 
May 2006 to work as a project director on the Austin Hospital. 
However, the contract was not signed until October 2003. Five 
variations to the contract’s term were made. These occurred in: 
• May 2006, with a 25-month extension (to June 2008) and a 
change in duties (additional nominated project and acting 
group head duties) 
• January 2007 to July 2011 because of role as group head 
• June 2011– extending until December 2011 
• December 2011– extending until December 2012.  
At no point was the market tested before the variations were 
made, nor was performance assessed and documented. In 
June 2011, the DBI Secretary approved the variation on the 
basis that it was the last, and the market was tested at 
expiration. In December 2011, the acting secretary approved 
the variation on the condition that under no circumstances 
would another extension be given without testing the market. 
In relation to cost, a bonus of $22 000 was paid in the first year 
based on an unsigned self-assessment. In January 2004, the 
contract was varied to remove the bonus, but the value of the 
contract was increased by 9 per cent to $1 155 million. A 
second variation occurred in October 2005, with the contract 
increased by a further 6 per cent. In May 2006, the contract 
was varied to provide the contractor with annual increases of 
3 per cent, in line with the VPS executive officer salary 
increase. The contractor was also provided with six weeks 
annual leave. In January 2007, the contract was varied to bring 
the annual rate to $321 200. It was $264 000 in 2002. In April 
2010, the contract was varied to increase the rate by 
5 per cent. In June 2011, when the contract was extended by 
six months, the value was varied by $189 330, bringing the 
annual rate to $378 660. In December 2011, the contract was 
varied again for further $378 000. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
05/2002–
05/2006 
Expected 
contract 
term 
4 years 
Actual 
contract 
end 
12/2012 
Actual term 9 years 
Difference 5 years 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$1.144m 
Expected 
final cost 
$3.501m 
Difference $2.357m 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$3.300m 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 2 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The contractor was engaged to provide project director services 
for the Rectangular Stadium between 2006 and 2009. In 
June 2008, the contract was varied and extended to May 2010 
so the contractor could work on another nominated project (the 
Biosciences project). At this time, the contract was varied to 
give the contractor the option, without conditions, to extend the 
contract for a further two years. In March 2010, via email, the 
contractor exercised an option to extend the contract by two 
years, until April 2012. In December 2011, the contractor 
exercised a further option to extend the contract, until 
December 2012.  
For the first option to extend, the lack of any conditions created 
a situation where it appears that it was the sole discretion of the 
contractor to extend. There was no assessment of the ongoing 
need for the contractor, nor was there any assessment of the 
contractor’s performance before extensions. There are also no 
documented approvals of the extension. It is unclear on what 
basis the second extension was made, as there is nothing to 
indicate that the contract was varied again to provide for this. 
In relation to cost, a variation was made to the contract in 
June 2008, increasing the value of the contract by around 
$12 000 each year (from $247 500 per annum to $260 000 
per annum). In March 2010, the contract was varied, increasing 
by $2 000 each year to compensate for Major Projects Victoria 
(MPV) no longer providing the contractor with a mobile phone. 
The contract provides for annual increases in the fee, and this 
is the reason for the estimated contract cost being exceeded. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
05/2006–
05/2009 
Expected 
contract 
term 
3 years 
Actual 
contract end 
10/2012 
Actual term 6 years 
Difference 3 years 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$742 500 
Expected 
final cost 
$1.686m 
Difference $944 000 
Actual cost 
at July 2012 
$1.742m 
Contractor 3 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The contractor was an MPV employee immediately before 
being engaged as a contractor, finishing with MPV in 
March 2010. There are no declarations around conflicts of 
interest. This is a standard contract with no documented 
variations to date. However, there is no documented need for 
the contractor, with the recruitment process focused on 
contractors only. There was no assessment of capability and 
capacity within the public sector. There is also no documented 
performance management. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2010–
03/2013 
Expected 
contract 
term 
3 years 
Actual 
contract end 
03/2013 
Actual term 3 years 
Difference 0 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$816 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$816 000 
Difference 0 
Actual cost 
at July 2012 
$638 475 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 4 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes This is a standard contract with no documented variations to 
date. However, there is no documented need for the 
contractor, with the recruitment process focused on contractors 
only. There was no assessment of capability and capacity 
within the public sector. There is also no documented 
performance management.  
In October 2010, the contract was varied by extending the term 
by two years and by increasing the annual rate by around 
$12 000. There is no documented rationale for the variations. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2010–
10/2010 
Expected 
contract 
term 
6 months 
Actual 
contract end 
10/2012 
Actual term 2.5 years 
Difference 2 years 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$111 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$580 000 
Difference $469 000 
Actual cost 
at July 2012 
$562 721 
Contractor 5 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract No The contractor was an MPV employee immediately before 
being engaged as a contractor, finishing with MPV in 
December 2005. MPV engaged the contractor in 2006, with 
the first payment for services recorded in June 2006. There is 
no documented contract, although according to a 2012 MPV 
draft memo, the contractor is ‘currently employed at MPV 
under open agreements with no end date. As the limits under 
which their services were contracted have now been 
exceeded, MPV considers it preferable to have a fixed-term 
contract in place going forward’.  
Contract time frames have been determined based on the 
contract times for other contractors that were appointed 
through the same recruitment process. Given the contractor 
came through the same recruitment process as contractors 
three and four in this list, it is unclear why different contract 
arrangements were put in place. The contract cost is an 
estimated annual amount, based on the daily rates submitted 
as part of the tender process. The actual cost is unknown. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2010–
unknown 
Expected 
contract 
term 
Open 
Actual 
contract end 
Open 
Actual term Open 
Difference n.a 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$340 000–
unknown 
Expected 
final cost 
Unknown 
Difference n.a. 
Actual cost 
at July 2012 
$1.674m 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 6 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract No The contractor was employed, on a secondment basis, with 
MPV before being contracted. The first payment for services 
with MPV was April 2007. There is no contract on record for 
the contractor. Like contractor 5, this one is ‘currently 
employed at MPV under open agreements with no end date’ 
and similarly ‘...the limits under which their services were 
contracted have now been exceeded’. The contractor also 
came through the same recruitment process as contractors 
three, four and five in this list.  
Contract time frames have been determined based on the 
contract times for other contractors that were appointed 
through the same recruitment process. Give the contractor 
came through the same recruitment process as contractors 4 
and 5 in this list, it is unclear why different contract 
arrangements were put in place. The contract cost is an 
estimated annual amount, based on the daily rates submitted 
as part of the tender process. The actual cost is unknown. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2010– 
Unknown 
Expected 
contract 
term 
Open 
Actual 
contract 
end 
Open 
ended 
Actual term Open 
Difference n.a 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$280 000 
Unknown 
Expected 
final cost 
Unknown 
Difference n.a 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$1.082m 
Contractor 7 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The contractor was an MPV employee immediately before 
being engaged as a contractor, finishing with MPV in October 
2009. MPV then engaged them as a contractor in the same 
month. There are no declarations around conflicts of interest. 
This is a standard contract with no documented variations to 
date. However, there is no documented need for the contractor 
and nor is there documented performance management. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
10/2009–
10/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
3 years 
Actual 
contract 
end 
10/2012 
Actual term 3 years 
Difference 0 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$903 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$903 000 
Difference 0 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$837 946 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 8 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes This is a standard contract with no variations to date. There is 
no documentation around the need for the contractor or for 
performance management. The contract provides for annual 
increases in the fee, and this is the reason for the estimated 
contract cost being exceeded. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
09/2007–
09/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
5 years 
Actual 
contract 
end 
09/2012 
Actual term 5 years 
Difference 0 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$1.155m 
Expected 
final cost 
$1.155m 
Difference 0 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$1.268m 
Contractor 9 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The contract was originally for 2.5 months to work on the 
Beacon Cove project. The contract was varied once, adding a 
further 1.5 months at an additional cost of $22 900. The reason 
for the variation is cited as delays by other parties in the 
project. While the actual contract end date was expected to be 
March 2012, it appears that the contractor is still performing 
against the contract. However, there is no documentation of 
further contracts or contract variations. The status of this 
contract is, therefore, uncertain. 
While the actual cost for this contractor is $983 457, this 
relates to the contractor entity. It has provided a range of 
different contractors for MPV over a long period of time. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
12/2011–
02/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
2.5 
months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
03/2012 
Actual term 4 months 
Difference 1.5 
months 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$23 375 
Expected 
final cost 
$46 365 
Difference $22 990 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$983 457 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 10 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract Yes The consultant was contracted to provide services relating to 
Beacon Cove. The original contract was for a three-month 
period, with a value of $25 000. In March 2012, a further 
contract was entered into, for the same services. However, the 
time frames for the second contract are unclear. They are 
stated in the letter of acceptance as ‘resolve matters as soon 
as possible’. There is also no quote for the second contract, 
when at least one should be required. Both letters of 
acceptance from DBI state that the contract fee has been set 
at $25 000 to comply with DBI’s ‘single select’ procurement 
guidelines. Given the short time frames between contracts (for 
the same work), it appears as contract splitting—the practice of 
minimising contract costs to avoid more onerous quotation 
requirements. As the consultant has been identified by MPV as 
current, the uncertain time frames may mean that this contract 
has no end date and is ongoing. On 8 March 2012, a third 
contract was entered into with the consultant for similar 
services, but a different site (former fish market). The contract 
value was $15 000, and this contract is also not supported by a 
single quote. There is also no end date stipulated, suggesting 
that the contract is ongoing. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
10/2011–
12/2011 
Expected 
contract 
term 
3 months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
Unknown 
Actual term Unknown 
Difference n.a 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$25 000 
Expected 
final cost 
Unknown 
Difference n.a 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$263 755 
Contractor 11 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract No MPV originally sought the recruitment of a public sector 
employee for this position. A departmental freeze on VPS staff 
meant that MPV recruited a contractor to circumvent the 
freeze. There is no documented contract, and information has 
been established through limited other information. There is 
also no documented evidence of the need, or the recruitment 
process, other than references to referrals from recruitment 
agencies. The value of the contract was $75 000, which 
included recruitment agency fees and ‘other’ taxes and levies. 
In October 2011, the contract was varied to extend it to 
January 2012. In December 2011, the contract was varied 
again to extend it to March 2012. In April 2012, the contract 
was varied again, until June 2012, and in June 2012, the 
contract was varied until September 2012. It is questionable 
whether this represents a short-term contract as originally 
intended. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2011–
10/2011 
Expected 
contract 
term 
6 months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
09/2012 
Actual term 17 months 
Difference 11 months 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$75 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$225 000 
Difference $150 000 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$179 061 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 12 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract A No The contractor was an MPV employee immediately before 
being engaged as a contractor, finishing with MPV in 
December 2009. MPV then engaged the contractor in January 
2010 to work on its project management framework. Between 
January 2010 and November 2010, the contractor also worked 
on two other projects (see contracts B and C below) that, while 
not contracted by MPV, were projects that MPV was managing. 
In December 2011, MPV entered into a contract with the 
contractor in an area he had previously managed at MPV—
ecologically sustainable development (ESD). There is no 
documented contract information for this engagement and 
details have been obtained from internal memos. The contract 
was for $25 000 (capped), which represented 25 days over a 
six-month period. The rationale for the contract was that 
interest in ESD had waned, and it therefore needed a 
dedicated resource.  
  
Expected 
contract 
dates 
12/2010–
06/2011 
Expected 
contract 
term 
6 months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
06/2011 
Actual term 6 months 
Difference 0 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$25 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$25 000 
Difference 0 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$181 500 
Contract B Yes In April 2011, in response to a request for tender (RFQ) for 
contractors to work on three projects, the contractor was 
appointed for a period of six months, at a rate of $77 000. This 
was to work on one of the Port of Hastings redevelopment. In 
November 2011, the contract was varied because additional 
funding had become available. The contract term was 
extended until June 2012, while the contract value was also 
varied by $72 000. The total value of the contract ($149 000), 
with extensions, is coincidently just below $150 000 at which 
point an open tender would have been required. 
 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
04/2011–
01/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
6 months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
06/2012 
Actual term 14 months 
Difference 8 months 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$77 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$149 000 
Difference $72 000 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
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Figure C1 
Contractor details – continued 
Contractor 12 – continued 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract C Yes In June 2011, a third contract was created for services under 
the early 2011 RFQ. These services were for a period of 
six months, working on the second of the three projects in the 
RFQ. The value of the contract was $22 000. It is questionable 
that two contracts were required for the one RFQ, or whether it 
should have been on the one, particularly given the similarity in 
time frames. This creates the impression of contract splitting to 
avoid compulsory tender processes. Since December 2010, 
the total value of continuous contracts created is $226 000.   
Expected 
contract 
dates 
06/2011–
01/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
6 months 
Actual 
contract 
end 
06/2012 
Actual term 6 months 
Difference 0 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
$22 000 
Expected 
final cost 
$22 000 
Difference 0 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
 
   
Contractor 13 
Contract details Audit comments 
Contract  No The contractor was originally performing administrative tasks 
for MPV under an arrangement with a recruitment agency. 
MPV’s efforts to fill a project support vacancy internally were 
unsuccessful, and it was not permitted to advertise externally. 
The contractor was engaged to perform this role because they 
were already contracted for another purpose. There is no 
documented contract, and very little information about the 
arrangements. 
Expected 
contract 
dates 
Unknown 
–10/2012 
Expected 
contract 
term 
Unknown 
Actual 
contract 
end 
10/2012 
Actual term Unknown 
Difference Unknown 
Expected 
contract 
cost 
Unknown 
Expected 
final cost 
Unknown 
Difference Unknown 
Actual cost 
at July 
2012 
$72 000 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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Appendix D. 
 Notes to Figure 3B 
Figure D1 
Summary of key factors that affected delivery of projects  
as reported by Major Projects Victoria 
Project Summary of impacts on project delivery 
Museum Victoria Scope changes included additional capacity 
for 300 cars and the inclusion of the IMAX 
theatre 
Sidney Myer Music Bowl refurbishment and 
redevelopment 
Significant industrial issues, additional 
scope changes and design defects 
extended time and cost 
Royal Park Sports Facility Scope changes included upgrades to sports 
provisions and general upgrades to the 
netball building 
Velodrome/Multi-Purpose Venue Key factors that contributed to cost and time 
variations included issues with the roofing 
structure and industrial relations issues 
Malthouse Plaza Additional scope items included 
landscaping, signage, changes to statutory 
requirements mid-project regarding safety 
systems and changes to the quality of 
fixtures and fittings 
National Gallery of Victoria Additional demolition works and industrial 
relations costs and delay/extension costs 
impacted delivery 
Austin Health redevelopment and Mercy 
Hospital for Women relocation (new towers) 
There were numerous additions to this 
project including theatre upgrades, Mercy lift 
extension works, works to generator 
sub-station and the Austin PABX and IT 
upgrade 
Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre – 
Stage 2 
Additional scope items included ecologically 
sustainable development initiatives and the 
addition of a hydrotherapy pool post-tender 
William Barak Bridge  Soundscape public art installation was 
added to the project scope 
Bonegilla Migrant Settlement Camp  
(Block 19) 
Delays associated with handover of the site 
between the Commonwealth and State 
Government affected project costings and 
additional entrance and exit works were 
added to the projects cope 
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Figure D1 
Summary of key factors that affected delivery of projects, as reported by 
Major Projects Victoria – continued 
Project Summary of impacts on project delivery 
Parliament House Catering Facilities 
redevelopment 
Two major delays were experienced, firstly 
due to the discovery of unknown cabling 
and devices at the commencement of the 
project, and secondly as asbestos was 
found in the old kitchen requiring manual 
removal of concrete 
Melbourne Recital Centre and MTC Theatre Significant scope changes included 
requirements for additional equipment not 
included in the original project scope 
Hepburn Springs Bathhouse The physical condition of existing buildings 
was worse than thought and additional 
scope included the addition of a retaining 
wall and decking 
Melbourne Rectangular Stadium 
(AAMI Park) 
Major changes related to additional items 
not in scope such as catering facilities, 
naming rights, turf installation and fit out of 
the stadium 
Southbank Cultural Precinct Redevelopment 
Stage 1  
Variations mainly related to additional 
equipment 
Melbourne Park Redevelopment – Stage 1 
(Early works) 
During early works unknown site problems 
were encountered such as the existence of 
underground cabling which impacted 
delivery of the original scope and required 
additional works 
Melbourne Markets Relocation This is a current project and an extension of 
time was issued under the terms of the 
contract. A number of changes initiated by 
the state were incorporated in 2009, prior to 
awarding the construction contract 
Princes Pier Delays and increased costs to complete the 
project were primarily due to the existing 
pier structure being in worse condition than 
originally thought by MPV 
State Sports Facilities Project This is a current project scheduled for 
completion in August 2012. Significant 
additional scope impacting the cost and time 
to complete the project includes the addition 
of another storey to the athletics 
administration building, refurbishment of 
Bob Jane Stadium and additional sports 
lighting 
Melbourne Park Redevelopment –Stage 1 
(Eastern Plaza) 
Material variations include changes to the 
ecologically sustainable rating of the 
development and additional costs caused by 
site contamination issues 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information provided by Major Projects 
Victoria. 
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Appendix E. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
 
Introduction  
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was 
provided to the Department of Business and Innovation and the Department of 
Treasury and Finance with a request for submissions or comments. 
The submission and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Department of Business and Innovation ..................................................................... 74 
Department of Treasury and Finance .......................................................................... 76 
 
Further audit comment: 
Auditor-General’s response to the Department of Treasury and Finance ................... 76 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance 
 
Auditor-General’s response to the Department of Treasury and 
Finance 
Consistent with our recommendations, we welcome the Department of Treasury and 
Finance's undertaking to examine and rectify any potential inconsistency between the 
delegations and the Standing Directions. 
 
Auditor-General’s reports 
 
Reports tabled during 2012–13 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Carer Support Programs (2012–13:1) August 2012 
Investment Attraction (2012–13:2) August 2012 
Fare Evasion on Public Transport (2012–13:3) August 2012 
Programs for Students with Special Learning Needs (2012–13:4)  August 2012 
Energy Efficiency in the Health Sector (2012–13:5) September 2012 
Consumer Participation in the Health System (2012–13:6) October 2012 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General's Office are available 
from: 
• Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
